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JUVENILE JUSTICE IN CALIFORNIA:
A RE-EVALUATION
By RALPH E. BocHEs*
Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile
who has violated the law may not feet that he is being fairly treated
and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel.**
IN re Gault' has focused the attention of bench, bar and legislators
on our nation's juvenile justice system. This landmark decision holds
that due process in the juvenile court is a constitutional requirement,
and affords to the juvenile most of the rights now afforded the adult
offender. Every state will be required to make some modification
of its juvenile court laws as a result of the decision. Most will com-
pletely overhaul their juvenile court system.
California can take just pride in having initiated the trend to-
wards procedural protection of the rights of juveniles. The Arnold-
Kennick Juvenile Court Law2 as enacted in 1961 has been hailed as a
model for other states to follow. Such basic concepts as detention
hearings,3 right to counsel,4 appointment of counsel for indigents,5
mandatory records of proceedings,6 and the sealing of records7 were
spearheaded by California.
Significant developments have taken place since 1961. Both New
Yorks and Illinois9 have entirely rewritten their juvenile court laws.
The Children's Bureau of the Department of Health, Education and
Welfare has promulgated revised standards for juvenile and family
courts.'0 A wealth of valuable material casting new insight into the
operation of the juvenile justice system has appeared in print. Student
* B.A., 1955, Lake Forest College; J.D., 1959, University of Michigan.
Chairman, Juvenile Court Committee of the Bar Association of San Francisco,
1963-64. Member, San Francisco Bar. Co-author, forthcoming California
Continuing Education of the Bar book on California Juvenile Courts.
* * WHEELER & COTTRELL, JUvENILE DELINQUENcy-ITs PREVENTION AND
CONTROL 33 (Russell Sage Foundation 1966), cited in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26
(1967).
1 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
2 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 500-914.
3 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 632.
4 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 633, 700.
5 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 700.
6 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 677.
7 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 781.
8 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT §§ 711-84 (McKinney 1963).
9 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701 (1965).
10 U.S. DEP'T Or HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELF., STANDARDS FOR JUVENILE AND
FAmILY COURTS (Childrens Bureau Pub. No. 437, 1966) [hereinafter cited as
STANDARDS], prepared in cooperation with the National Council on Crime and
Delinquency and The National Council of Juvenile Court Judges.
[47]
writers at two distinguished law schools have prepared thought-pro-
voking notes based on the actual observation of the operation in num-
erous juvenile courts and interviews with court personnel.' Earlier
this year the President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Ad-
ministration of Justice produced a comprehensive study of our na-
tion's criminal court system, including its juvenile court system.1
2
California now has the benefit of 6 years of practical experience
under its Juvenile Court Law. Many problems of the law in operation
have developed which were not apparent to its framers.
13
In response to Gault, the legislature in the waning days of the 1967
regular session enacted legislation which cures some of the more glar-
ing deficiencies in California law. However, many serious problems
remain and, in some instances, newly enacted legislation will create
additional problems, the ramifications of which perhaps were not fully
considered by the legislature.
It is appropriate at this time to make a searching re-analysis and
re-evaluation of our juvenile court law. Hopefully, such an analysis
not only will assist California in improving its own juvenile justice
system,'4 but will also be useful to other states that propose to use our
juvenile court law as a model for their own reform.
Before analyzing the law itself in detail it will be helpful to
summarize briefly the general scheme of the law as enacted in Cali-
fornia in 1961, the findings of the Governor's Special Study Commis-
sion on Juvenile Justice,15 the recommendations of the President's
Commission, and Gault.
I.
A Thumbnail Sketch of the Juvenile Court Process
Juvenile court jurisdiction depends upon two factors: (1) the
age of the minor '1 and (2) the conduct of the minor, 17 or his circum-
11 Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individual-
ized Justice, 79 HARv. L. REV. 775 (1966); Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in
the Juvenile Courts, 67 CoLum. L. REV. 281 (1967).
12 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION Or
JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter cited
as NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT].
13 Numerous housekeeping amendments were enacted in 1963 to cure
minor vagaries in the law.
14 Revision in the juvenile court law in California is a continuous process.
More than 40 bills were introduced in the legislature in 1967.
15 GOvERNoR's SPECIAL STUDY COMM'N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE (1960) [here-
inafter cited as CAL. JuV. JUSTICE COMM'N].
16 The age of the minor is determined at the time of the commission of
the offense. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 604(a). The judge may also cer-
tify the case to the juvenile court when the case is pending and the person
is under 21. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 604(b).
17 Jurisdiction may be based upon either a violation of state, federal or
local law, or of a court order (CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602), or conduct
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stances.18
In practice the cut-off point for juvenile court jurisdiction usually
is the age of 18.19 However, cases of minors of 16 and 17 who commit
criminal offenses can be remanded to the adult criminal courts if the
minor is not amenable to the care, treatment, and training facilities
available through the juvenile court.20  Proceedings against minors
between 18 and 21 can be instituted in either the juvenile court2' or
the adult courts,22 and either court system has the power to transfer
the case of such a minor to the other.23 However, the juvenile court
is seldom utilized for minors over 18.
The typical juvenile delinquency case begins with the apprehen-
sion of a minor by a policeman. The officer then has the alternatives
of releasing the minor with a warning or citing him to appear before
the probation officer, or physically delivering him to the probation
officer.24 If the minor is delivered to the probation officer, he must be
released unless urgent and immediate necessity for his detention
exists.25 If so, a hearing must be had before the juvenile court within
approximately 3 judicial days26 to determine whether further deten-
tion is warranted.
27
The probation officer has three alternatives in dealing with the
minor: to admonish and dismiss;2 to institute a program of informal
evidencing a strong tendency towards delinquency, e.g., the refusal to obey
reasonable parental orders, children "beyond control," habitual truants, and
those in danger of leading an idle or dissolute life (CAL. WEL. & INsT'Ns CODE
§ 601). In the language of the law such children are potential "wards." CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 726. In this article, wards are referred to as delin-
quents, which is the more conventional terminology utilized in the NAT'L
CRIaVE Comm'x REPORT.
Is Those lacking parental control, or who are destitute, or whose home
is unfit by reason of neglect, cruelty or depravity. CAL. WFLP. & INST'NS CODE
§ 600.
19 The juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over any person charged
with the commission of a public offense or crime when such person was
under the age of 18 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 603.
20 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707. Prior to the 1967 amendment, only
felony-type cases could be transferred. Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 534, § 1, at 1850.
21 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 600-02 (defines persons under the age of
21 years as coming within the jurisdiction of the court).
22 See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 604.
23 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 604(b), 707.
24 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 626.
25 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 628.
26 To be exact, the petition must be filed within 48 hours following the
time of apprehension by the arresting officer, non-judicial days excepted
(CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 631), and the detention hearing must be held
before the expiration of the next judicial day after filing (CAL. WELT. &
INST'NS CODE § 632). Non-judicial days are Saturdays, Sundays and legal
holidays.
27 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 636.
28 See CAL. WELT. & INsT'xs CODE §§ 652, 653.
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supervision with the consent of the minor's parents or guardian, to
last not more than 6 months;29 or to file a petition with the court.3 °
If a petition is filed the court holds a bifurcated hearing.31 At
the adjudicatory or "factfinding" phase of the hearing the court deter-
mines whether it has jurisdiction over the minor,32 i.e., whether the
minor has committed the offense or is in fact a dependent and neg-
lected child. If the court finds that it has jurisdiction over the minor,
it proceeds to the matter of disposition,33 which may or may not be
heard on the same day. Dispositional alternatives include leaving the
child in his home under the supervision of the probation officer, with
or without wardship; 34 removal to a foster home or private child-care
institution;35 in the case of delinquent minors, placement in a county
ranch, camp or home;3 6 and in the case of minors committing acts




The Governor's Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice
The professional Advisory Committee of the Governor's Special
Study Commission on Juvenile Justice made a study of juvenile court
practices throughout the state of California, which culminated in a
comprehensive report published in 1960.38 The Committee found
these problems: (1) an absence of well-defined standards and norms
to guide judges, and probation and law enforcement officials in their
decision-making; (2) basic legal rights neither adequately nor uni-
formly protected; (3) inconsistencies in philosophy, imperfect co-
ordination of efforts, and disparity in administration; (4) the quality
of rehabilitative services of questionable effectiveness and in many
instances based more upon expediency and administrative conveni-
ence than rehabilitation and social justice; (5) substantial unwar-
ranted detention of children; and (6) numerous ambiguities and con-
tradictions in the law which necessitated revision.39
29 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 654.
30 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 652, 656.
31 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 701-02.
32 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 701.
83 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 702.
84 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 707, 730.
35 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 727.
36 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 730.
37 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 731.
38 Note 15, supra.
39 CAL. JUV. JUSTICE COM'N-PART I, at 12: "There are several major
problems which seriously impede the efficient administration of juvenile
justice in California. Among the most critical are the following:
1. There is an absence of well-defined, empirically derived standards
[Vol. 19
November, 1967] CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE
The Commission then prepared a draft law which entirely re-
wrote the juvenile court law of the state,40 using the following prin-
ciples as its guidelines:
1. That the juvenile court should not intervene in the parent-child
relationship unless it has a sound basis in fact for its action.
2. That every child and his parents have a right to a fair hearing on
the allegations which have brought the minor before the juvenile
court, and all parties should have their legal and constitutional
rights protected.
3. That the juvenile court should protect children from unnecessary
separation from their parents, whether on a temporary or a per-
manent basis.
4. That the juvenile court law should have uniform application
throughout the state, based upon clearly defined procedures.
5. That no child should be taken into custody or detained without
reasonable cause for believing that the child has committed a de-
and norms to guide juvenile court judges, probation, and law en-
forcement officials in their decision making. Consequently, instead
of a uniform system of justice, varied systems based upon divergent
policies and value scales are in evidence. Actually, whether or not a
juvenile is arrested, placed in detention, or referred to the probation
department, and whether or not the petition is dismissed, probation is
granted, or a CYA commitment is ordered by the juvenile court,
seems to depend more upon the community in which the offense is
committed than upon the intrinsic merits of the individual case.
2. Basic legal rights are neither being uniformly nor adequately pro-
tected under present juvenile court provisions and procedures.
3. The relatively independent status of the official agencies in the ju-
venile justice processes has produced inconsistencies in philosophy,
imperfect coordination of efforts, and disparity in administration.
4. The quality of rehabilitative services is of questionable effectiveness
and, in many instances, case decisions seem to be based upon considera-
tions of expediency and administrative convenience rather than upon
the objectives of rehabilitation and social justice. This is partly be-
cause juvenile courts and official delinquency control agencies have
been seriously overtaxed by the sizeable growth in the number of
children brought to their attention without commensurate increases
in available services, staff, or treatment facilities.
5. There is excessive and unwarranted detention of children in the state.
6. The present juvenile court statute contains numerous ambiguities and
contradictions and is in urgent need of revision and reorganization.
"Notwithstanding these observations, the Commission is of the firm con-
viction that the protective and rehabilitative philosophy of the juvenile court
law is sound and should remain unchanged. To implement this philosophy,
the Commission favors the continuance of a segregated court, operating in
a relatively informal atmosphere, which is empowered to provide some or all
parental guidance and assistance to children in need or in trouble, where such
assistance is not available from the natural parents. However, statutory
changes in the present juvenile court law are urgently needed if the critical
problems and questionable practices which have been identified are to be
corrected.
"As has been said above, all recommendations made by the Commission
have been subjected to scrutiny and comment by professionally interested
persons in California. Equally important, every recommendation relating
to juvenile court processes and procedures reflects existing and tested prac-
tice somewhere in California."
40 CAL JUv. JUSTICE Cor.maVN-PART I, App. A.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
linquent offense, has exhibited delinquent tendencies, or is an
abandoned or neglected child, and that such detention is necessary
for his protection or that of the community.
6. That the juvenile court should have reasonable assurance that
meaningful rehabilitation services will be provided when wardship
is imposed for delinquent behavior or child neglect.
7. That the juvenile court must provide adequate protection to the
child and the community.
8. That the juvenile court should exploit the clinical knowledge and
skills of treatment specialists and should increase the status of
probation departments. 4'
IlI.
The President's Commission on Crime
In July of 1965 President Johnson established the Commission on
Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, popularly known as
the President's Commission on Crime.42 That commission made a
searching study and re-evaluation of the entire criminal justice sys-
tem as it existed throughout the United States, including the juvenile
justice system, and issued its report in February of 1967.43
The reality of 1967 was that the administration of juvenile justice
in most states (not including California) was a nightmare.44 Virtu-
ally no procedural safeguards were provided for the minor. No pro-
vision was made for the appointment of counsel, and in some states
the presence of counsel was forbidden. 45  Minors and their parents
were given no written notification of the charges against them.
46
Often the jurisdiction of the juvenile court was exercised by inferior
court judges totally lacking in legal training or even college educa-
tion.47 A minor could be detained between the time of apprehension
and the time of hearing at the whim and caprice of the probation
officer, without provision for bail.48 Unlimited dispositional alterna-
tives were available to the court for the most trifling offense.4 9 Hear-
ings, if they took place, were unreported. 50 No provision was made for
41 Id. at 10-11.
42 Exec. Order No. 11,236, 3 C.F.R. 329-31 (1967).
43 Note 12 supra.
44 See, e.g., James, Juvenile Justice--"The Worst of Both Worlds," The
Christian Science Monitor, May 10, 1967, at 11.
45 See PREsIDENT's COmm'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION
OF JusTicE, TASK FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YouTH CRimvE 81,
tables 14-15 (1967) [hereinafter cited as DEL. TASK FORCE REPORT]; Holmes'
Appeal, 379 Pa. 599, 109 A.2d 523 (1954).
46 DEL. TASK FORCE REPORT 82, table 17.
47 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14 n.14 (1967). For an analysis of the
California situation, see Gough, Referees in California's Juvenile Courts: A
Study in Sub-Judicial Adjudication, 19 HASTINas L.J. 3 (1967).
48 See Annot., 60 A.L.R. 287 (1946); cf. DEL. TASK FORCE REPORT 79, table
8.
49 See, e.g., CAL. WELY. & INST'NS CODE §§ 730-31.
50 DEL. TASK FORCE REPORT 40. For an example of a case involving an
unreported hearing, see In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
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appeals. 5 1 Treatment resources were negligible, 52 and the minor fre-
quently was committed to a "reform school" which did little more than
train him for a life of crime.53 All too often the juvenile court, to use
the words of Mr. Justice Fortas, was nothing more than a "kangaroo
court."
54
To alleviate the situation, the President's Commission first calls
for a clear recognition of the essential nature of the juvenile court-
concern for the protection of the community as well as merely rehabil-
itation.55 It calls upon us to recognize the stigmatic effect of juvenile
court proceedings, 5 and suggests that the juvenile court be reserved
for the more serious offender.57 At the same time it suggests that the
full gamut of procedural safeguards must be made available to the
juvenile offender because of the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile
court proceedings.58
The Commission suggests that the juvenile court is no longer the
appropriate vehicle to deal with the petty delinquent or the minor in
danger of becoming a delinquent, and that in its place youth service
bureaus be established to perform this function and to act as co-
ordinators of community resources.59 This proposal recognizes that
delinquency results as much from societal conditions as it does from
behavioral disorders, and that the only way to approach the overall
problem of delinquency is to deal with the conditions that cause it. 0
51 DEL. TAsK FORCE REPORT 40.
52 Id. at 8.
5 Id.
54 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 28 (1967).
55 NAT'L CRimE COMm'N REPORT 80-81.
56 Id. at 88; DEL. TAsK FORCE REPORT 92-93. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S.
1 (1967).
57 NAT'L CRnvIE COmm'N REPORT 85.
58 Id. at 85-86.
59 Id. at 66-67.
00 The specific recommendations of the Commission are as follows:
"Efforts, both private and public should be intensified to:
Reduce unemployment and devise methods of providing minimum family
income.
Reexamine and revise welfare regulations so that they contribute to keep-
ing the family together.
Improve housing and recreation facilities.
Insure availability of family planning assistance.
Provide help in problems of domestic management and child care.
Make counseling and therapy easily obtainable.
Develop activities that involve the whole family together." Id. at 66.
"Efforts both private and public should be intensified to:
Involve young people in community activities.
Train and employ youth as subprofessional aides.
Establish Youth Services Bureaus to provide and coordinate programs
for young people.
Increase involvement of religious institutions, private social agencies,
fraternal groups, and other community organizations in youth programs.
It also recognizes that the juvenile justice system screens out the
middle and upper-class offender, and that the juvenile court system
Provide community residential centers." Id. at 69.
"In order that slum children may receive the best rather than the worst
education in the Nation, efforts, both private and public, should be intensi-
fied to:
Secure financial support for necessary personnel, buildings, and equip-
ment.
Improve the quality and quantity of teachers and facilities in the slum
school.
Combat racial and economic school segregation." Id. at 73.
"In order that schools may better adapt to the particular educational problems
of the slum child, efforts, both private and public, should be intensified to:
Help slum children make up for inadequate preschool preparation.
Deal better with behavior problems.
Relate instructional material to conditions of life in the slums." Id. at 74.
"In order that schools may better prepare students for the future, efforts, both
private and public, should be intensified to:
Raise the aspirations and expectations of students capable of higher
education.
Review and revise present programs for students not going to college.
Further develop job placement services in schools." Id.
"In order that schools may become more responsive to community needs and
parental expectations, efforts, both private and public, should be intensified
to develop cooperation between schools and their communities." Id.
"Efforts, both private and public, should be intensified to:
Prepare youth for employment.
Provide youth with information about employment opportunities.
Reduce barriers to employment posed by discrimination, the misuse of
criminal records, and maintenance of rigid job qualifications.
Create new employment opportunities." Id. at 77.
"To the greatest feasible extent, police departments should formulate policy
guidelines for dealing with juveniles.
All officers should be acquainted with the special characteristics of adoles-
cents, particularly those of the social, racial, and other specific groups with
which they are likely to come in contact.
Custody of a juvenile (both prolonged street stops and stationhouse visits)
should be limited to instances where there is objective, specifiable ground for
suspicion.
Every stop that includes a frisk or an interrogation of more than a few pre-
liminary identifying questions should be recorded in a strictly confidential
report." Id. at 79.
"Police forces should make full use of the central diagnosing and coordinating
services of the Youth Services Bureau. Station adjustment should be limited
to release and referral; it should not include hearings or the imposition of
sanctions by the police. Court referral by the police should be restricted to
those cases involving serious criminal conduct or repeated misconduct of a
more than trivial nature." Id. at 82.
"Communities should establish neighborhood youth-serving agencies-Youth
Services Bureaus-located if possible in comprehensive neighborhood com-
munity centers and receiving juveniles (delinquent and nondelinquent) re-
ferred by the police, the juvenile court, parents, schools, and other sources.'
Id. at 83.
"Juvenile courts should make fullest feasible use of preliminary conferences
to dispose of cases short of adjudication." Id. at 84.
"Juvenile courts should employ consent decrees wherever possible to avoid
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol 19
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is primarily applied to the indigent.6'
The proposed juvenile justice system as outlined by the Presi-




The sad saga of Gerald Francis Gault, 15, demonstrates most of
the vices which have existed in the juvenile court system.
2
Gerald was taken into custody by the police and delivered to the
probation officer as a result of a verbal complaint of a neighbor about
a telephone call made to her in which the caller made lewd or indecent
remarks. His parents were given no notice that he had been taken
into custody. The following day a petition was filed with the court,
but never served on Gerald or his parents.
At the court hearings no witnesses were sworn, and no record of
the proceedings was made. Although Gerald himself denied having
used any lewd language, and attributed it to a friend, the complaining
witness was not called. Gerald was not advised of his right to counsel,
adjudication while still settling juvenile cases and treating offenders." Id.
"The movement for narrowing the juvenile court's jurisdiction should be con-
tinued." Id. at 85.
"Counsel should be appointed as a matter of course wherever coercive action
is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice by child or parent."
Id. at 87.
"Juvenile court hearings should be divided into an adjudicatory hearing and
a dispositional one, and the evidence admissible at the adjudicatory hearing
should be so limited that findings are not dependent upon or unduly influ-
enced by hearsay, gossip, rumor, and other unreliable types of information."
Id.
"Notice should be given well in advance of any scheduled court proceeding,
including intake, detention, and waiver hearings, and should set forth the
alleged misconduct with particularity." Id.
"Adequate and appropriate separate detention facilities for juveniles should
be provided." Id.
"Legislation should be enacted restricting both authority to detain and the
circumstances under which detention is permitted." Id.
61 Id. at 58. See also DEL. TAsK FORcE REPORT 10; Paulsen, Juvenile
Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 694 (1966). The
circumstantial probability of the family of the middle class offender being
able to deal with situations confronting it are great, and the odds that the
authorities concerned will view the case in this fashion are even greater. The
family of means generally has alternatives available to it which are substan-
tially better than those available through the juvenile court system, e.g., pri-
vate psychiatric care, enrollment of the minor in a military or boarding school,
or, if necessary, the hiring of a full-time attendant. The children of middle
and upper class families seldom are before the court in neglect proceedings,
other than child beating.
62 The facts of the case are set out in In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 4-11 (1967).
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his right of confrontation and cross-examination, or his privilege
against self-incrimination.
For an adult the maximum penalty for the offense Gerald was
alleged to have committed would have been 2 months in jail.6 3 Since
he was a minor the juvenile court in the exercise of its tender mercy
had the power to comnnit him to the Arizona State Industrial School
until the age of 21, which it did. Under Arizona law no provision
existed for appeal.
Proposed Juvenile Justice System
Referral
Sou ce




























63 Id at 29.
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Mr. Justice Fortas, speaking for the majority, first noted that:
We do not in this opinion consider the impact of these constitu-
tional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile
and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating
to juvenile "delinquents." For example, we are not here concerned
with the procedures or constitutional rights applicable to the pre-
judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor do we direct our attention
to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process .... We consider
only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the
proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juve-
nile is a "delinquent" as a result of alleged misconduct on his part,
with the consequence that he may be committed to a state institution.
As to these proceedings, there appears to be little current dissent from
the proposition that the Due Process Clause has a role to play. The
problem is to ascertain the precise impact of the due process re-
quirement upon such proceedings.
64
The Court then analyzed in detail the history of the juvenile
court movement.6 5 It noted that the early reformers called for the
abandonment of the idea of crime and punishment. The child was to
be "treated" and "rehabilitated" and the procedures, from apprehen-
sion through institutionalization, were to be clinical rather than puni-
tive.66 The doctrine of parens patriae was explored by the Court
and discredited.
67
The Court then proceeded to ruthlessly cut through the rhetoric
that had surrounded the juvenile court system and noted that the
juvenile court system had been ineffective in furnishing the rehabili-
tation which it promised. It noted that due process was not at vari-
ance with the basic objectives of the juvenile court system, that the
absence of due process often impeded rehabilitation, and that the
presence of due process would encourage it.68 The Court summarized
its observation by stating, "Under our Constitution the condition of
being a boy does not justify a kangaroo court."0' 9
64 Id. at 13-14.
"The Nat'l Crime Comm'n Report recommends that 'Juvenile courts
should make fullest feasible use of preliminary conferences to dispose of
cases short of adjudication.' . . . Since this 'consent decree' procedure would
involve neither adjudication of delinquency nor institutionalization, nothing
we say in this opinion should be construed as expressing any views with
respect to such procedure. The problems of pre-adjudication treatment of
juveniles, and of post-adjudication disposition, are unique to the juvenile
process; hence, what we hold in this opinion with regard to the procedural
requirements at the adjudicatory stage has no necessary applicability to other
steps of the juvenile process." Id. at 31, n.48.
65 Id. at 12-25.
66 Id. at 15-16.
67 "The Latin phrase proved to be a great help to those who sought to
rationalize the exclusion of juveniles from the constitutional scheme; but its
meaning is murky and its historic credentials are of dubious relevance ....
[T]here is no trace of the doctrine in the history of criminal jurisprudence."
Id. at 16.
68 Id. at 24-27.
69 Id. at 28.
Turning to the specific issues raised in the case, the Court held
that written notice of the offense charged and the time of hearing,
together with adequate time to prepare, was required; 70 that there
is a right to counsel and the appointment of counsel in case of indi-
gency in every instance in which the minor may be removed from his
home to an institution in which his freedom is impared 71 and that
parents must be advised of this right; that the right of confrontation
and cross-examination must be provided;72 that the privilege against
self-incrimination applies73 and must be explained to the minor; 74 and
that jurisdiction can be based only on "sworn testimony subjected to
the opportunity for cross-examination."7 5 The court found it unnec-
essary to rule on the right to appellate review and transcript of pro-
ceedings.76
r. Justice Black, concurring, held that the Constitution re-
quires that minors be afforded all the guarantees of the Bill of Rights
that are made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amend-
ment.
77
Mr. Justice White, concurring, suggested that the court should
have reserved matters relating to the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion for another day, but otherwise concurred in the opinion.
78
Mr. Justice Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part,
took the position that due process required nothing more than ade-
quate notice, advice of right to counsel, and the maintenance of a
record.7 9
70 Id. at 31-34.
71 Id. at 41. Quaere: Is counsel required if commitment of the child to
an institution is not sought? The writer submits that the answer should be
in the affirmative. Counsel should be provided whenever the state proposes
to intervene in the relationship between parent and child.
72 Id. at 56.
73 Id. at 55.
74 Id. The State of Arizona ingeniously argued that while the minor
might have the right to remain silent, nevertheless the court ought not to be
required to warn the minor of that right because confession is good for the
soul. The court, id. at 51, pointed to the observations of WHEELER & COTTRELL,
JuvENILE DELINQUENCY-ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL (Russell Sage Founda-
tion, 1966), reprinted in DEL. TASK FORCE REPORT, app. T, at 409, as author-
ity for the proposition that the child who is induced to confess by parental
urging on the part of officials, followed by disciplinary action, is likely to be
hostile, adverse, and to believe that he has been "tricked."
75 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 57 (1967).
76 Id. at 58. The procedure in Arizona provided for neither a record nor
appellate review. Id. at 57-58. The Court noted that the effect was "to im-
pose upon the juvenile judge the unseemly duty of testifying under cross-
examination as to the events that transpired in the hearings before him." Id.
at 58.
77 Id. at 61.
78 Id. at 65.
79 Id. at 72.
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Mr. Justice Stewart, dissenting, was the sole champion for the
classic position that juvenile proceedings are not criminal, inasmuch
as the juvenile court is concerned solely with rehabilitation. He con-
cluded that inflexible restrictions should not be imposed on those
"public social agencies known as juvenile or family courts." 80 On the
facts he found no need to deal with the questions presented, finding
that Gerald Gault had received adequate notice.81
As noted above, the decision is specifically limited to the rights
of minors at the adjudicatory hearing. It does not pass on require-
ments for either pre-adjudicatory procedures or dispositional hear-
ings. These questions are reserved for another day.
8 2
V.
Analysis of the California Juvenile Court Law
The following analysis is designed to bring to light the more
significant defects in the California Juvenile Court Law, and to sug-
gest remedial measures. For convenience of reference the organiza-
tion is in accordance with that of the Juvenile Court Law. 3 Included
are summaries of the more important changes made by the 1967
amendments, and where the amendments themselves have caused
additional problems, these are discussed.
Article I-General Provisions
Section 517 of the California Welfare and Institutions Code,
adopted in 1963, gives the court power to order compensation for ap-
pointed counsel, the amount of which shall be determined by the
court, and paid out of the general fund of the county. However, sec-
tion 634, as amended in 1963, provides only that the court can fix
compensation for appointed counsel in "a county where there is no
public defender." Can the court order compensation for appointed
counsel in a county having a public defender? The law is not clear.
All major counties in the state have a public defender system.
However, the public defender is not authorized to appear in depend-
ency cases.84 In addition, private counsel frequently is appointed to
represent the minor or his family in delinquency cases when an under-
staffed public defender is unable to provide necessary personnel or
80 Id. at 79.
81 Id. at 81.
82 See note 64 supra.
83 CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE §§ 500-914. All textual references to sec-
tions are to CAL. WELF. & INSr'NS CODE, unless otherwise indicated.
84 CAL.. GOV'T CODE § 27706(e).
where there is a conflict of interest.8 5 Appointed counsel should be
entitled to adequate compensation in all cases.81
Arficle 2-Commissions and Commi±±ees
The Juvenile Justice Commission in California is the watchdog
of the juvenile justice system.87 However, the members of the com-
mission in each county are now appointed by the judge of the juvenile
court.8 Since the commission oversees the operation of the court, as
well as the operation of the probation department, its independence
should be insured by having someone other than the juvenile court
judge act as the appointing body.
In counties having regular rotation of the juvenile court judge-
ship many of the commissioners will not have been appointed by
the incumbent juvenile court judge. Commissioners serve 4-year
terms.8 9 In some larger counties rotation occurs as frequently as once
every 6 months. On the other hand, in some other larger counties
the juvenile court judge has served for at least 4 years and at the end
of that time all commissioners have been appointed by the incumbent
judge. In any event, for the commission to properly play its "watch-
dog" role it must be an independent public body which owes its ap-
pointment and responsibility to some appointing authority other than
the juvenile court judge (whether incumbent or not) and which is not
a part of the very system it guards.
85 The State Conference of Barristers (attorneys under 35) has set up
panels in major counties throughout the state to handle both dependency and
delinquency cases of indigents on a regular basis.
Using the City and County of San Francisco as an example, one full-time
public defender is assigned to the juvenile court to cover the caseload of one
judge and three full-time referees. The public defender handles only delin-
quency cases. The Legal Aid Society of San Francisco, the San Francisco
Neighborhood Legal Assistance Foundation (funded by the Office of Eco-
nomic Opportunity), and the Juvenile Court Panel of the Barristers Club
(affiliated with the Bar Association of San Francisco), all provide counsel
in dependency cases. In addition, the Panel has provided counsel in delin-
quency cases when requested to do so either by an indigent minor or by the
public defender's office, and in instances in which the court has declined to
appoint counsel in delinquency cases in which appointment is discretionary.
In October, 1967, the Legal Aid Society opened an office with three attorneys
who will devote all their time to juvenile court work.
86 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION or
JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 60 (1967).
87 It is the duty of the commission "to inquire into the administration of
the juvenile court law in the county or region in which the commission
serves." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 529. All counties with the exception
of the County of Los Angeles have juvenile justice commissions.
88 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 525. If the county has more than one
juvenile court judge, the appointment is made by the presiding judge of the
juvenile court.
89 Id.
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In most larger counties the independence of the commission could
be better preserved by having the appointments made by a majority
of the judges of the superior court acting jointly 0 In one-judge
counties the board of supervisors might act as a confirming body.
Provision should also be made for staggering the 4-year terms of
the commissioners.9 1 And some orderly means for increasing or de-
creasing the number of commissioners is required to clear up the
ambiguity in the present law.
9 2
Article 3--The Juvenile Court
Right to be Tried by a Judge
No person should be deprived of his liberty without being tried
before a judge if he so desires.93 Under the present system a person's
only hearing may be before a referee9 4 who is not a lawyer.95 If the
hearing is reported there is no automatic right to a rehearing before a
judge.90 The law should be amended to provide that at the request
90 The recommendation is made in a recent study of the administration
of the probation department of the County of San Mateo, California. GRaF-
FINHAGEN-KROEGER, INC., ADMINISTRATION Or THE PROBATION DEPARTMENT,
COUNTY OF SAN MATEO 9 (1964).
91 In place of a juvenile justice commission, the County of Los Angeles
has a probation committee whose members' terms are staggered. CAL WELF.
& INST'NS CODE §§ 540-42.
92 The draft law proposed by the Governor's Special Study Commission
provided that the Board of Supervisors could increase the number of com-
missioners. CAL. Juv. JUSTICE Comnw'N-PART I, at 55. This particular portion
of section 525 was not enacted by the legislature. It is therefore unclear
whether the number of commissioners is inflexible, or whether the judge of
the juvenile court has the right to increase the number of commissioners at
will.
93 Some attorneys prefer to have contested jurisdictional matters heard
by a judge, on the theory that long term referees (particularly those who
are former supervising probation officers) may be too thoroughly integrated
into the administrative system of the probation department. On the other
hand, the judge, particularly a recently appointed one, may focus more upon
the evidence than upon a belief that the child has everything to gain and
nothing to lose by obtaining the benefit of the "services" available from the
court.
94 Juvenile court referees are appointed by the presiding judge of the
juvenile court, and hear such cases as are assigned to them by him. CAL.
WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 554. Referees appointed since 1961 are required to
have a total of 5 years experience as practicing attorneys, or as supervising
probation officers, or as a combination thereof. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE
§ 553. Neither the New York Family Court Act, nor the Illinois Juvenile
Court Law provides for referees.
95 Persons who have had more than 5 years experience as supervising
probation officers, but who lack legal training may be appointed as referees.
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 553. The U.S. Children's Bureau suggests that
all referees should be members of the bar in which they serve, with some
experience in the practice of law., -.STANDAmDS 106.
906 The hearing is transcribed and'reviewed by. the judge, who may in
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
of the minor or his parents the hearing in the first instance must be
held before a judge of the juvenile court. No good reason exists to
deny the minor this option, and many courts already grant such re-
quests as a matter of course.
Use of Probation Officers as Referees
In some counties, supervising probation officers regularly em-
ployed by the county are also appointed as part-time referees. This
practice is condemned by the United States Children's Bureau97 and
should be forbidden. The judiciary is to act as an independent check
upon the administrative system.9 8 Elementary concepts of due proc-
ess are violated by such a system, and the objectives of the law are
frustrated.
Disqualification of Referees
The law contains no provision for disqualifying juvenile court
referees. It would seem appropriate to extend to referees the provi-
sions of section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the dis-
qualification of judges. In place of the objection procedure now set
forth,9 9 the juvenile court judge logically would pass upon the ques-
tion of disqualification. In addition, consideration might be given
to adopting a pre-emptory disqualification procedure similar to the
one set forth in section 170.6 of the Code of Civil Procedure.100
The following interesting question in regard to disqualification
of referees exists: Referees serve at the pleasure of the presiding
judge of the juvenile court.10 If the presiding judge of the juvenile
court is disqualified, does this in turn automatically disqualify all
the referees? The conclusion would necessarily seem to follow, since
his discretion grant or deny a rehearing. CAL. WELF. & INSTN'S CODE § 558.
If the hearing is not reported the minor is entitled to a rehearing before the
judge as a matter of right. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 558. If the rehearing
is granted the hearing before the judge is conducted de novo. CAL. W=nr.
& INST'NS CODE § 560.
97 STANDARDS 106.
98 CAL. Juv. JusTicE CO 1'N-PART I, at 39-41.
99 CAL. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 170(5) provides for the judge and the party
disqualifying him, in case of a contest as to adequate grounds for disqualifi-
cation, to select some mutually acceptable justice or judge to decide the mat-
ter. If the parties cannot agree, the appointment is made by the Chairman
of the Judicial Council.
100 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 170.6(2) (3) provides that an attorney may
make an oral or written motion supported by affidavit or oral statement
under oath to the effect that the judge has a prejudice against the attorney
or the party. Upon such motion, without any further act or proof, the judge
supervising the master calendar shall assign another judge to the case. In
the case where there is no supervising judge, the chairman of the judicial
council shall assign another judge to the case.
101 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 553.
[Vol. 19
November, 1967] CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE
otherwise the minor's case would be heard by an officer who serves
at the pleasure of a judge whose bias and prejudice have been estab-
lished in the manner provided by law. For this reason it is desirable
to provide for the appointment of referees by a majority of the
judges of the superior court, acting jointly, rather than by the pre-
siding judge of the juvenile court. The problem thereby would be
solved in counties having more than one judge, and in most of the
one-judge counties the referee system does not prevail.
Notice of Whether Court Reporter Wil Be Present
No provision is made for notification to counsel as to whether a
hearing before a referee will be taken down by a court reporter.
102
Such information is essential to adequate preparation and the devel-
opment of trial strategy. If the hearing is unreported the minor is
entitled to a rehearing before the judge as a matter of right.103 If
the hearing is reported a rehearing is a matter of discretion, based
upon the court's review of the transcript of the proceedings before
the referee.104 The practical consequences of this distinction are self-
evident. If the hearing is unreported the minor has another bite at
the apple if he loses, and consequently can present his case without
concern for making a record. He need not attempt to put on a full
case-which in and of of itself may be desirable in promoting the in-
formality and interplay which the juvenile court process usually
seeks. If the finding or disposition are unsatisfactory his automatic
rehearing is available.
Rehearing before a Judge
The referee should be required to advise the minor and his par-
ents at the conclusion of the hearing of the right to request a rehear-
ing before the judge. If the minor is not represented by counsel and
desires a rehearing, the referee himself should be required to pre-
pare and file the application.10 5 The minor who has waived his right
to appointed counsel in the hope of simplifying the proceedings should
not be put to the disadvantage of having to prepare legal documents
because of the waiver.
After application for rehearing of a reported case has been filed,
102 The official court reporter transcribes hearings before referees "as
directed by the court." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 677. The decision as to
whether or not to report the case is often determined by the exigencies of the
circumstances, such as the availability of the regular court reporter if the
judge is not holding court at the same time. As a matter of practice the
probation officer often makes the decision.
103 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 558.
104 Id.
105 FED. i. Crm. P. 37.
the judge is required to read the transcript of the proceedings before
the referee, and to determine whether or not to grant the rehearing. 10 6
This is an affirmative duty imposed on the judge. Yet the law states
that the application shall be deemed denied if not granted within 20
days. 10 7 There is no rational basis for the assumption that the judge's
failure to make any order means that he has carefully reviewed the
record and has determined not to grant the request for rehearing.
Instead, the law should be revised to provide that the application for
rehearing shall be deemed granted unless the court within 20 days
denies the application.
In addition, some time limits should be provided for the comple-
tion of the rehearing before the judge. Section 657 requires that a
hearing on the merits be held within 30 days after the filing of the
petition unless the minor is detained in custody at that time, in which
case the hearing must be held within 15 judicial days. However, no
time limits whatsoever are established for the judge to conduct a re-
hearing if the initial hearing was conducted before a referee. As a
result a minor could languish in juvenile hall for weeks until the re-
hearing takes place.
Article 4-Probation Officers
Administrative Independence of the Probation Officer
The greatest single defect in the juvenile court law as enacted in
1961 is its failure to unequivocally place administrative control of the
probation department in the hands of the chief probation officer.
Prior to 1961 the law provided that the chief probation officer
would be nominated by the probation committee'08 and appointed by
the juvenile court judge. 0 9 He could be removed by the judge for
cause, and by the judge without cause with the consent of the proba-
tion committee.110 In charter counties the manner of appointment
was governed by the county charter."' The practical effect was to
give the court virtually unfettered power to hire and fire the chief
probation officer.
106 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 558.
107 Id.
108 The Probation Committee was the predecessor to the Juvenile Justice
Commission. At the recommendation of the Governor's Committee, the name
of the Probation Committee was changed and its duties were modified to re-
lieve it of all administrative responsibilities. CAL. JUV. JUSTICE Co1v'N-
PART I, at 50.
109 Cal. Stats. 1945, ch. 1395, § 6, at 2600 (formerly Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns
Code § 105).
110 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, at 3475 (formerly Cal. Well. & Inst'ns
Code § 635).
111 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 2136, § 1, at 4445-46 (formerly Cal. Well. & Inst'ns
Code § 634).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 19
November, 1967] CALIFORNIA JUVENILE JUSTICE 65
The Governor's Commission observed:
Present statutes vest administrative control of probation depart-
ments in the hands of the juvenile court judges by giving them the
authority to select probation officers in all but two counties. The two
exceptions, Los Angeles and San Diego Counties, have county char-
ters which provide for appointment and administrative control of
chief probation officers by the board of supervisors.
The Commission observes that juvenile court judges play varying
roles in the administration of probation departments. A small num-
ber of judges are intimately involved in the details of administration.
The majority, however, have delegated administrative responsibili-
ties to their chief probation officers, largely because of the pressure of
other judicial duties. However, almost all juvenile court judges retain
and exercise ultimate policy making powers.
The Commission believes that the juvenile court judge's role in
the treatment process should be limited to establishing judicial
checks on an administrative function.112
The Commission went on to note both the lack of logic and the vices
engendered by the existing scheme, and the advantages of a clean-cut
separation of powers."15
112 CAL. Juv. JusTicE Com'N-PART I, at 39.
113 Id.
"I. The present administrative arrangement produces an unnecessary co-
mingling of judicial and treatment functions without parallel in any other
court. In our view, there is no more logic for a juvenile court judge to ad-
minister a probation department than for a criminal court judge to be ad-
ministratively responsible for the district attorney's office, county jails, or
honor farms. In the adult field, these functions have been recognized as
separate and distinct; the same should apply to the juvenile field.
"2. The present administrative relationship between juvenile court judges
and probation departments is an inappropriate historical vestige, created 50
years ago under totally different social and governmental conditions. The
large scale probation departments of today bear little resemblance to their
historical counterparts. Nowadays, probation departments have extensive
administrative responsibilities, whereas a half century earlier they had only
minor administrative responsibilities. Today, probation departments not
only have large professional staffs, but also operate clinics, juvenile halls, and
camps. Fifty years earlier, their staffs were small and no institutions were
administered.
"The complex problems of administering probation departments require
chief probation officers to confer frequently with county administrative of-
ficers on budgets, capital outlay, and personnel. If there is to be effective
administration, there must be a direct relationship between probation officers
and county managers so that appropriate administrative problems can be
resolved without the delay often created by having to involve the juvenile
court judge in the decision making process.
"3. The experience of the two large counties functioning under the pro-
posed administrative arrangement, Los Angeles and San Diego, reinforces the
conclusion that this recommendation is both sound and practical. In both
instances, despite the administrative independence of one from the other, there
is a compatible, cooperative relationship between the juvenile court judge and
the chief probation officer.
"4. This recommendation will insure more consistent administrative poli-
cies and procedures. In many of the large counties, juvenile court judges are
currently rotated on an annual or more frequent basis. In many instances,
whenever a new juvenile court judge is appointed, the probation department
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The Governor's Commission proposed a plan of appointment in
which a majority of the judges of the superior court would nominate
a candidate from a list of three persons selected on a merit system,
and the board of supervisors in turn would make the appointment."
4
Removal of the chief probation officer would require the combined
action of a majority of the superior court judges and the board of
supervisors." 5  Charter counties would be required to follow the
general law." 6
The reform proposal was opposed both by juvenile judges and by
chief probation officers. The juvenile court judges feared diminution
of their powers. Probation officers, particularly in smaller counties,
were concerned that they would be subjected to political pressure
from the board of supervisors if they lost their sheltered status as
court appointed attach6s. In the face of this opposition the sponsors
of the bill abandoned these provisions, and the law remained un-
changed." 7
The Corrections Task Force of the President's Commission, like
the Governor's Commission, analyzed the problems created by the
juvenile court judge acting as administrative head of the probation
department primarily from a practical and policy viewpoint:
has to radically adjust its policies and procedures. Furthermore, these policy
changes are often based on totally different treatment philosophies from the
previous judge. These result in administrative complications which, in our
view, are totally unnecessary.
"5. In a few counties, two or more judges share equally the juvenile court
responsibilities. Probation officers in these counties are sometimes in the
unenviable position of attempting to satisfy two judges who may have di-
vergent views on appropriate probation department policies." Id. at 39-40
(emphasis added).
114 Section 575 of Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code, as proposed by the Governor's
Commission, reads as follows:
"In every county, there shall be a department of probation, supervised by
a probation officer. Such probation officer shall be appointed by the board of
supervisors on recommendation of a majority of all judges of the superior
court of the county, acting jointly, from among the three highest ranking
applicants for the office on a list of eligible persons established pursuant to a
civil service or merit system. The probation officer can be removed from
office by the board of supervisors for cause on recommendation of the judges
of the superior court, acting jointly. The probation officer shall receive the
compensation fixed by the board of supervisors or civil service commission."
CAL. Juv. JUSTIcE CommiVv'x-PART I, at 60.
"15 Id.
116 The draft laws proposed by the Governor's Commission contain no
provision corresponding to Cal. Stats. 1946, ch. 66, § 1, at 99 (formerly Cal.
Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 634), reenacted as CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 576.
This section permits charter counties to establish their own method of ap-
pointment. It is not clear whether the Governor's Commission considered
CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7, relating to the independence of charter counties. The
answer to that question is beyond the scope of this article.
t17 Interview with an informed source, September 27, 1967, who prefers
to remain anonymous.
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In most major cities .. the probation department is a complex
organization requiring continuous and intensive administrative atten-
tion by professional, full-time managers. This is particularly true of
local juvenile probation departments, which often operate detention
homes, psychiatric clinics, and foster homes, as well as carrying out
supervision functions. To manage so widely dispersed an operation
requires specialized expertise and close control which are almost im-
possible for a judge whose career investment is not in administration.
Moreover, organizational effectiveness and continuity of policy are
apt to be seriously impaired in an agency subject to detailed ad-
ministrative direction by both a judge and a chief probation offi-
cer.118
Apparently, at least in this area of juvenile court law, no atten-
tion was given by either the Governor's Commission or the Task Force
to constitutional considerations of due process-not surprising in the
pre-Gault era.
The writer submits that Gault requires the juvenile court judge
to be totally divorced from the administrative system of the juvenile
probation department. Reduced to its simplest terms, Gault holds
that "the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process
and fair treatment." 1 9 The juvenile court judge cannot in a legal
sense be impartial if he also acts as chief administrator of the depart-
ment responsible for presenting and prosecuting the case against the
minor. In the juvenile court, as well as in any other court, the judi-
ciary must be independent. 20
Article 4 of the Juvenile Court Law should be amended to un-
equivocally state that the chief probation officer is the chief execu-
tive and administrator of the juvenile probation department, and
that the juvenile court judge shall not involve himself in the adminis-
tration of the probation department.121 Furthermore, the law should
118 PREsIENT'S ComM'x ox LAw ENFORCEMENT AND ADMiNIsTRATIoN or
JUsTIcE, TAsK FORCE REPORT: CORREcTIONS 35 (1967).
119 Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966), cited in In re Gault,
387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
20 Cf. A.B.A. CANONS or PRoFEssIoNAL AND JUDICIAL ETmcs, Canon 24, at
51 (1957) provides:
"24. Inconsistent Obligations.
A judge should not accept inconsistent duties; nor incur obligations, pe-
cuniary or otherwise, which will in any way interfere or appear to interfere
with his devotion to the expeditious and proper administration of his official
functions."
121 Nothing in the juvenile court law provides that juvenile court judge
shall in fact act as the chief administrator of the juvenile probation depart-
ment, and this is a result of historical relationships rather than a mandate of
the statute. As the Governor's Report notes: "[P]resent statutes vest ad-
ministrative control of probation departments in the hands of the juvenile
court judges by giving thera the authority to select probation officers in all
but two counties." CAL. Juv. JUSTIcE Comn'N-PART I, at 39 (emphasis
added). In theory the problem might be resolved by a clear mandate that
the judge was not to interfere in administration, but it is doubtful that the
long-standing historical relationship could be so easily broken.
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be amended to provide a scheme of appointment and removal of
chief probation officers which relieves the chief probation officer from
the predicament of serving at the pleasure of the juvenile court
judge.122 The scheme proposed by the Governor's Commission is a
reasonable one.123 Others are available. 2 4
The Probation Officer in Court
The probation officer is placed in an impossible position in the
contested juvenile court case. For all practical purposes, he acts as
the prosecutor. The supposed friendly counselor to the minor, who
is expected to play the role of helpful mentor both before and after
the hearing, becomes the minor's adversary during the hearing.
125
If the minor is represented by counsel, the result frequently is
catastrophic. No probation officer can be expected to play the role of
an attorney when questions of evidence and the admissibility of
confessions are presented. All too often the result is that the judge
must become the attorney for the probation officer.126 This in turn
may lead the minor to believe (sometimes with justification) that he
cannot receive a fair and impartial hearing because the judge has now
become his adversary. 127 Juvenile court judges, referees, probation
officers and attorneys all have found the situation to be a difficult
122 'Probation officers may at any time be removed by the judge of the
juvenile court for good cause shown; and the judge of the juvenile court
may in his discretion at any time remove any such probation officer with the
written approval of the majority of the members of the juvenile justice com-
mission." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 575. Bearing in mind that no standards
are established "for good cause shown," and that the juvenile court judge
appoints the Juvenile Justice Commission (But see note 90 supra), the juvenile
court judge as a practical matter has the power to hire or fire the chief proba-
tion officer at will.
123 See note 114 supra.
124 In some chartered counties the office of the chief probation officer is
included within the Civil Service System. In Los Angeles and some other
chartered counties, the chief probation officer is appointed and removed by
the board of supervisors.
125 REPORT OF JUVENILE COURT COMM. OF THE BAR Ass'N OF SAN FRANCIsco
22-24 (1962) [hereinafter referred to as SAN FRANcIsco REPORT].
126 Id.
127 Paulsen, Juvenile Courts, Family Courts, and the Poor Man, 54 CALIF.
L. REV. 694, 704 (1966). Cf. Preamble to A.B.A., CANoNs oF PROFEssIoNAL AN
JuDIcAL. ETHics 1 (1957):
"In America, where the stability of Courts and of all departments of gov-
ernment rests upon the approval of the people, it is peculiarly essential that
the system for establishing and dispensing Justice be developed to a high point
of efficiency and so maintained that the public shall have absolute confidence
in the integrity and impartiality of its administration. The future of the Re-
public, to a great extent, depends upon our maintenance of Justice pure and
unsullied. It cannot be so maintained unless the conduct and the motives of
the members of our profession are such as to merit the approval of all just
men."2
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one.
128
The legislature this year adopted a solution which may create
more vices than it remedies. Now the district attorney will be per-
mitted to appear in juvenile court cases if the minor is represented
by counsel, and if the court invites him to appear. 2 9 Practice will
vary from county to county, and from court to court, depending upon
the disposition of the judge. We may anticipate that in some coun-
ties the district attorney will appear as a matter of routine in all cases
in which the minor is represented by counsel. The introduction of
the district attorney may well serve to unduly and unnecessarily in-
tensify the adversary nature of juvenile court proceedings, and tend
to overemphasize the quasi-criminal nature of the juvenile court. In
the final analysis the workability of the plan will depend upon how
effectively the court exercises its power to fix terms and conditions of
representation.
30
An unfortunate side effect may be to discourage the minor from
obtaining counsel. If he does not obtain counsel, the district attor-
ney cannot appear to prosecute him.
The existing scheme obviously is unworkable,' 3' and better solu-
tions are available. Larger probation departments could add attor-
neys to their own staff, who in turn would present contested cases in
court. 3 2 One might reasonably anticipate that such attorneys would
128 SAN FRAmicsco REPORTS 22-24. The U.S. Children's Bureau recom-
mends:
"No staff member of the court should assume the role of prosecutor. This
follows from the noncriminal nature of neglect and delinquency proceedings.
However, an attorney to represent the State, especially in contested cases,
should be available to the court. This is necessary in order to prevent the
judge from being placed in the untenable position of being a party to the pro-
ceedings." STAcAms 73.
120 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 681:
"In a juvenile court hearing, where the minor who is the subject of the
hearing is represented by counsel, the district attorney may, with the consent
of the juvenile court judge, appear and participate in the hearing to assist
in the ascertaining and presenting of the evidence.' Where the petition in a
juvenile court proceeding alleges that a minor is a person described in either
subdivision (a) or subdivision (b) of Section 600, and either of the parents, or
the guardian, or other person having care or custody of the minor, or who
resides in the home of the minor, is charged in a pending criminal prosecution
based upon unlawful acts committed against the minor, the district attorney
may represent the minor in the interest of the state at the juvenile court pro-
ceeding with the consent or at the request of the juvenile court judge. The
terms and conditions of such representation shall be with the consent or ap-
proval of the judge of the juvenile court." (emphasis added).
130 Id.
131 See SAx FamNcisco REPORT 22-24. -
232 Id. In several other counties a few. probation officers .have been
specially trained as court hearing officers and .present all contested cases
in court. This practice may present problems in the unauthorized practice of
law, and in any event represents the use -of time and talents of a professional
which are outside the area of his professional competence.
be close to the philosophy of the juvenile court law. In counties not
large enough to utilize the services of an attorney in the department
on a full-time basis, the role of the attorney could better be filled by
the county counsel in comties where this system prevails. The use of
the district attorney could be relegated to those counties where there
is no county counsel.
Article 5--Jurisdiction
Dependent Children
The President's Commission suggests that "[d] ependency jurisdic-
tion should be abolished since such cases involve inability rather than
willful failure to provide properly for children and can adequately
and more appropriately be dealt with by social, nonjudicial agen-
cies.' 133 Accordingly, our law defining jurisdiction in the juvenile
court should be amended to delete reference to one "[w] ho is destitute,
or who is not provided with the necessities of life, or who is not pro-
vided with a home or suitable place of abode"'13 4 or who has no
parent or guardian. 3 5
Moreover, a 1965 amendment to the dependency section brings
within its provisions children physically dangerous because of mental
deficiency.136 This is an inappropriate use of the juvenile court and
specific provisions for placement in appropriate mental institutions
ought to be provided. Section 506 already requires that dependent chil-
dren be kept physically separated from delinquent children. This has
created a substantial practical problem for the probation department
in that it is placed in the position of housing physically dangerous
children in facilities not designed for such children.
Minors in Danger of Leading an Immoral Life
Section 601 provides:
Any person under the age of 21 years who persistently or habitu-
ally refuses to obey the reasonable and proper orders or directions of
his parents, guardian, custodian or school authorities, or who is beyond
the control of such person, or any person who is a habitual truant
from school within the meaning of any law of this State, or who
from any cause is in danger of leading an idle, dissolute, lewd, or
immoral life, is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court which may
adjudge such person to be a ward of the court.
The President's Commission suggests that:
Any act that is considered a crime when committed by an adult
133 NAT'L. CRIME CoMM'N REPORT 85.
34 CAL. WELF. & INST'Ns CODE § 600.
135 Id.
136 Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 535, § 1, at 1851, establishing CAL. WELr. & INsT'Ns
CoDE § 600(c).
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should continue to be, when charged against a juvenile, the business
of the juvenile court.
The conduct-illegal-only-for-children category of the court's juris-
diction should be substantially circumscribed so that it ceases to in-
clude such acts as smoking, swearing, and disobedience to parents
and comprehends only acts that entail a real risk of long-range harm
to the child, such as experimenting with drugs, repeatedly becoming
pregnant out of wedlock, and being habitually truant from school.
Serious consideration, at the least, should be given to complete elimi-
nation of the court's power over children for noncriminal conduct. 3 7
Revision of section 601 would appear appropriate.138  If and when
youth service bureaus as suggested by the President's Commission are
established, 3 9 elimination of section 601 jurisdiction entirely may well
be in order.
Article 6-Temporary Custody and Detention
Advice as to Constitutional Rights
A 1967 amendment to the Juvenile Court Law now requires both
the arresting officer and the probation officer to advise the minor that
anything he says may be used against him, and to advise him of his
constitutional rights, including the right to remain silent, the right
to have counsel present during any interrogation, and the right to
have counsel appointed if the minor is unable to afford counsel.
40
The minor is permitted to make an intelligent waiver of these
rights. 141 Uncertainty exists as to whether any waiver made in the
absence of an attorney or a knowledgeable parent will be deemed
intelligent.1
42
137 NAT'L CRIME COmm'N REPORT 85.
188 Compare N.Y. FAmnLy CT. ACT § 712(b) (1963), and ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, §§ 702-3, 702-4(b) (1965).
130 NAT'L CRan'= Comivi'x REPORT 83.
140 CAL. WELF. & INS'NS CODE §§ 625(c), 627.5.
141 CAL. CODE CIV. PROc. § 372. The following language was added to this
section in 1967:
"Nothing in this section or in any other provision of this code, the Pro-
bate Code, or the Civil Code is intended by the Legislature to prohibit a
minor from exercising an intelligent and knowing waiver of his constitutional
rights in any proceedings under the Juvenile Court Law ......
142 The Supreme Court said in Gault: "We conclude that the constitu-
tional privilege against self-incrimination is applicable in the case of juve-
niles as it is with respect to adults. We appreciate that special problems may
arise with respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children, and
that there may well be some differences in technique-but not in principle-
depending upon the age of the child and the presence and competence of
parents .... If counsel is not present for some permissible reason when an
admission is obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the
admission was voluntary, in the sense not only that it has not been coerced
or suggested, but also that it is not the product of ignorance of rights or of
adolescent fantasy, fright or despair." In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 55 (1967).
The Supreme Court of California recently came to grips with the prob-
lem of whether a minor can waive his constitutional rights in the absence of
Notice to Parent or Guardian of Detention of Minor
The present law places the burden on the arresting officer of
notifying the family that the minor has been delivered to juvenile
hall.143 This burden should instead be placed on the probation officer
to provide for centralized handling of notification. A police officer
frequently takes the minor directly from the scene of an event to the
juvenile hall, and if the officer does not succeed during his shift, be-
cause of the involvements of business or otherwise, in notifying the
family of the detention, often no notification will be received at all.
The probation officer is in an ideal position to directly provide this
notification, either by telephone or telegram.
Duty of the Probation Officer to Investigate and Release-
Time for Release
Under the scheme of the law, the probation officer is charged
with the responsibility to "immediately investigate the circumstances
of the minor and the facts surrounding his being taken into cus-
tody,"'144 and to immediately release the minor to the custody of his
parents unless it appears that continued "detention of the minor is a
matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protection of the
a competent attorney or parent. People v. Lara, 67 A.C. 367, 62 Cal. Rptr. -
(1967). The defendants were charged with first degree murder and kid-
naping. Lara, 18 at the time of the commission of the offense, was sentenced
to death. Alvarez, a co-defendant, 17 at the time of the commission of the
offense (jurisdiction having been waived by the juvenile court) was
sentenced to life imprisonment. Despite the uncontradicted evidence that
Alvarez had a mental age of 10 years and 2 months, the majority permitted
the confessions to be admitted, stating:
"We cannot accept the suggestion of certain commentators (see 7 Santa
Clara Lawyer 114, 127 (1966); 40 WASH. L. REv. 189, 200-201 (1965)) that
every minor is incompetent as a matter of law to waive his constitutional
rights to remain silent and to an attorney unless the waiver is consented to
by an attorney or by a parent or guardian who has himself been advised of
the minor's rights. Such adult consent is of course to be desired, and should
be obtained whenever feasible. But as we will explain, whether a minor
knowingly and intelligently waived these rights is a question of fact; and a
mere failure of the authorities to seek the additional consent of an adult
cannot be held to outweigh, in any given instance, an evidentially-supported
finding that such a waiver was actually made." Id. at 381, 62 Cal. Rptr. at -.
Justice Peters, in a well-reasoned dissent, took the position that "no
minor may waive his constitutional right to remain silent, and his right to
counsel, unless and until he has the advice and counsel of some friendly
adult." Id. at 399, 62 Cal. Rptr. at -.
The Supreme Court of the United States probably will hear this case,
particularly since the death penalty is involved. Hopefully the Court will
come to grips with the broad proposition raised by Justice Peters in his
dissent, as well as with the narrower question of whether on the facts the
waiver was intelligent.
143 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 627.
144 CAL. WE.F. & INST'NS CODE § 628.
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person or property of another,"'145 or unless the minor is "likely to
flee the jurisdiction of the court."'1 46 While this provision has re-
sulted in substantial improvement in the practices prevailing in Cali-
fornia prior to 1961,147 it has not been sufficient to relieve California
of the ignoble distinction of having one of the highest detention rates
in the county.
Most minors are arrested at night or on the weekend. The Attor-
ney General has ruled that the obligation to immediately investigate
is satisfied if the probation officer begins the investigation at 8 a.m.
on the next judicial day.148 The result is that in many counties a
minor detained on Friday evening will be automatically detained until
Monday morning, and no practical means exists for obtaining release
of the minor in the interim.1 4 9 The probation officer should be re-
quired to investigate 7 days a week.150 While this may impose a bur-
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 The Governor's Commission observed:
"California has been severely criticized by national probation and child
welfare organizations for excessive juvenile detention practices. The Com-
mission's study, unfortunately, substantiates the validity of this criticism.
This conclusion is supported by the following facts: In 1958, more than 50,000
juvenile charges with delinquent acts were detained in juvenile halls, and
several thousand more were held in local police lockups or jails. In the same
year, California law enforcement agencies referred to probation departments
68,000 juveniles for delinquent acts. In other words, almost three-fourths of
the delinquent juveniles referred to probation departments by law enforce-
ment agencies were detained in juvenile halls. In some communities, the
ratio was even higher-virtually every juvenile referred by law enforcement
officers to the probation department was detained, notwithstanding the fact
that some minors were apprehended in error, many committed inconsequen-
tial offenses, and many others had responsible parents able to control the
minor pending the juvenile court appearance.
"The number of juveniles detained for minor offenses is shocking. The
Bureau of Criminal Statistics report on children admitted to juvenile hall
during 1958 discloses that approximately 8,400 juveniles were held for such
basically minor offenses as curfew violations, truancy, traffic violations, dis-
turbing the peace, and minor liquor law violations. The Commission also
has knowledge of at least one case where the juvenile was detained for jay-
walking!
"Furthermore, we note that a significant proportion of minors placed in
juvenile halls were later released without having juvenile court petitions
filed. This is further proof of excessive detention because, generally speaking,
if a minor's delinquency is serious enough to require juvenile court action, a
petition will normally be filed. Conversely, if the case is less serious, a
petition is not likely to be filed. The facts show that almost half (48 percent)
of the 49,000 juveniles initially referred to probation departments for delin-
quent acts last year did not have a petition filed. In a majority of instances,
they were detained in juvenile halls anywhere from a few hours to several
days." CAL. JUV. JUSTICE CommnI'N-PART I at 41.
148 39 Ops. CAL. ATT'Y GEN. 269 (1962).
149 SAN FRANcisco REPORT 14.
15o The San Francisco Report suggested that a probation officer should be
on duty from 8:00 A.M. until midnight, 7 days per week. SAN FRANcisco
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den on smaller probation departments, a price must be paid for a sys-
tem that has no other provision for release, and in the long run in
dollars should be less than the cost of care of the unnecessarily de-
tained child.
The probation officer can detain the minor for 48 hours, non judi-
cial days excepted, without filing a petition,' 51 and the detention
hearing is not held until the following day. 52 As a practical matter
this may stretch the period of detention to 6 days.153 The time period
should be limited to a flat 48 hours without any exceptions. 54
Still another defect in the overall scheme is that while the proba-
tion officer is charged with the obligation to "immediately investi-
gate," 55 the arresting officer who delivers the minor to the probation
officer is not required at the time of delivery to provide the probation
officer with sufficient initial facts to conduct that investigation. To-
wards that end the arresting officer should be required to furnish
the probation officer with a detailed police report at the time the
minor is delivered to the probation officer.156
Right to Make Telephone Calls
The law grants the minor no right to make telephone calls after
being detained. The practical result is that in many counties the
minor may be held incommunicado until such time as he comes to
court, unable to contact his parents, friends or an attorney who might
arrange for his release. The minor should be given the same absolute
right to make two telephone calls currently afforded to arrested
REPORT 17. The U.S. Children's Bureau suggests that "[c]ourts in large com-
munities should have a staff member on duty to screen detention intake be-
tween the hours of 8:00 A.M. and midnight. At all other times staff should
be available for consultation by telephone." STA-DARDs 61.
151 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 631.
152 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 632.
153 A 3-day holiday may intervene.
154 The flat 48-hour period is a common and frequently recommended
one. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-5 (1965); NAT'L CiunE Commnw'N REPORT
87.
The U.S. Children's Bureau sets up a more severe test: "A child should
not be detained for a period longer than 24 hours without the filing of the
petition invoking the jurisdiction of the court. This 24-hour rule should
operate continuously, irrespective of Sundays or holidays. A child should not
be detained for a longer time without a petition merely because he happens
to be found on a Sunday or holiday, or on the day immediately preceding."
STAiDARDS 61.
155 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 628.
156 At an Institute for Probation Officers conducted by the School of
Criminology, University of California, Berkeley, on September 19-20, 1967e
probation officers throughout the state complained of a lack of police reports
at the time of delivery. In many cases the officer bringing the minor to
juvenile hall was reported to be a "transportation officer" who knew nothing
of the details of the offense..
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adults.157
In opposition to this proposal it has been suggested by some that
the minor might use the opportunity to make two telephone calls to
warn accomplices, to urge fellow gang members to take retributive
action against those responsible for his detention, or to otherwise
interfere with the due administration of justice or public order. This
reasoning is equally applicable to adult offenders. Furthermore,
such objections ignore the fact that section 851.5 (a) of the Penal
Code requires the calls to be made in the presence of a public officer
or employee.
Bail
The law makes no provision for bail for minors detained as delin-
quents. The constitutional right to bail granted to adults in Cali-
fornia 5 8 has been denied to minors on the theory that juvenile court
proceedings are not criminal in nature.15 9 This rationale-that juve-
157 CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.5 provides:
"(a) Any person arrested has, immediately after he is booked, and, ex-
cept where physically impossible, no later than three hours after his arrest,
the right to make, at his own expense, in the presence of a public officer or
employee, at least two telephone calls from the police station or other place
at which he is booked, one completed to the person called, who may be his
attorney, employer, or a relative, the other completed to a bail bondsman.
"(b) Any public officer or employee who deprives an arrested person of
the rights granted by this section is guilty of a misdemeanor."
See also CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 5325(d).
158 CAL. CoNsT. art. I, § 6 provides: "All persons shall be bailable by
sufficient sureties, unless for capital offenses when the proof is evident or the
presumption great. Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed; nor shall cruel or unusual punishments be inflicted."
159 In re Magnuson, 110 Cal. App. 2d 73, 242 P.2d 362 (1952). In that case
the minor had already been adjudged a ward of the juvenile court and sought
to be admitted to bail pending an appeal. The court stated:
"These conclusions are fortified by a consideration of the general pur-
poses to be served by proceedings to declare a minor a ward of the court.
Such proceedings are for the benefit and protection of the minor when such
protection is needed by the occurrence of causes for wardship, as set forth
in the pertinent code sections. The result of a declaration of wardship, far
from being a conviction of crime, is more in the nature of a guardianship
such as is provided for in the Probate Code. To consider that such restraint
as the court, acting as guardian of its ward, finds necessary for the protection
and benefit of the minor, amounts to imprisonment, is to ignore the benefi-
cent purposes of the law. The control exercised by the court and by the
persons or agencies in whose immediate custody the ward may be placed is
akin to the former parental control for which it is a substitute. Indeed, it
would be surprising to find in this statute provisions for bail." Id. at 75, 242
P.2d 364.
However, no decided California case directly passes upon the right to
bail prior to a declaration of wardship.
In the adult criminal courts bail after conviction upon appeal is a matter
of right when the appeal is from a judgment imposing a fine only or from
a judgment imposing imprisonment in case of misdemeanor, and is a matter
of discretion in all other cases. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1272.
nile court proceedings are civil-has been thoroughly destroyed, and
the question of the applicability of the state constitutional provision
must now be considered an open one.160 The United States Supreme
Court in Gault specifically held that its opinion did not necessarily
relate to pre-adjudicatory hearing matters,161 but at least one state
court has anticipated that the Court will hold that denying bail to
minors is unconstitutional. 162
As a practical matter unnecessary and unwarranted detention
still frequently occurs in California.163 The rhetoric of the Juvenile
Court Law is no substitute for reality. Despite the basic undesirabil-
ity of a bail system, 64 the introduction of such a system as ancillary
160 Some other states have interpreted their constitutions as requiring
admission to bail in juvenile court cases. See Annot., 160 A.L.R. 287 (1946).
161 See note 64 supra.
162 The Kentucky Circuit Court for Jefferson County recently held that
bail is required:
"While the Supreme Court stated that it did not pass on the application
of the Bill of Rights to pre-trial proceedings in the Juvenile Court, the broad
and sweeping language used by it leaves little doubt in the mind of this Court
that when the question is presented to that Court, it will hold that juveniles
are entitled to bail just as are adults at any stage of the proceedings. The
right to bail is predicated upon the presumption of innocence. That presump-
tion of innocence remains with every person charged with a crime no matter
how serious until he is finally found guilty. In the instant case, although
Judge Suell has acted promptly and wisely under the existing Kentucky law,
it seems to this Court that the section of the Kentucky statute which denies
bail to juveniles is unconstitutional. The statutes does not limit the right of
the Juvenile Court to detain the juvenile for an indeterminate period until
the proceedings relating to him are disposed of. The Juvenile Judge may
order the juvenile confined with a written order. The law as written does
not require the Judge to state his reasons for the issuance of the order. Even
if it did, the fact remains that the juvenile is being confined in an institution
with locks on the doors and restrained of his liberty without the right to bail
no matter how wise it may be to so confine him." 1 Crim. L. Bull. 2121 (1967).
Judge Holtzoff has held that the eighth amendment makes bail mandatory
in the juvenile court in the District of Columbia. Trimble v. Stone, 187 F.
Supp. 483 (D.D.C. 1960).
163 A recent study by the California Youth Authority, covering 12 coun-
ties, shows that out of 21,321 minors detained, more than 20 percent were
brought into detention one day and released the next. 65 percent of the
children detained were released within 4 days. Only 15 percent of those
detained were released the same day. CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRME & DE-
LINQUENCY IN CALIFORNIA, 1965, at 190, table X-6 (1966).
164 DEL. TAsK FORCE REPORT observes at 36:
"The institution of bail, whereby an arrested person is given an oppor-
tunity to buy his release, may be seriously questioned as a rational solution
to the problems of prehearing custody, despite its ancient and constitutional
lineage. These questions are discussed elsewhere in this report. In any event,
it is one of those attributes of the criminal process that it is wise for the
juvenile court system to be free of. Release as of right plainly may interfere
with the protection or care required in some cases, and availability of free-
dom should not turn on the ability the child or his family to purchase it. On
the other hand, detention of children appears to be far too routinely and fre-
quently used, both while they are awaiting court appearance and during the
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to the existing system for release is required.16 5 The present system
provides no means of insuring release during the first 72 hours after
arrest, 6 6 and so far has in practice failed to effectively guard against
unnecessary and unwarranted detention.167 As undesirable as bail
is, it is the most effective check on the refusal of probation officers to
exercise their discretionary powers of release prior to the detention
hearing.
Notice of Detention Hearing
The law provides that if the probation officer determines that a
minor is to be retained in custody he shall immediately file a petition
to have the minor declared a dependent child or a ward of the court. 68
The petition is filed with the clerk of the juvenile court, who automat-
ically sets the matter down for a detention hearing before the court
on the next judicial day.16 9 The probation officer is required to notify
the minor's family of the time and place of hearing, and this notice
period after disposition and before institution space is available. The noto-
rious inadequacy and overcrowding of child detention centers and the not un-
common use of adult jails and lockups make the practice even less tolerable."
However, the President's Commission on Crime, in dealing with the
question of bail for adult offenders, noted:
"Although bail is recognized in the law solely as a method of insuring
the defendant's appearance at trial, judges often use it as a way of keeping
in jail persons they fear will commit crimes if released before trial. In
addition to its being of dubious legality, this procedure is ineffective in many
instances. Professional criminals or members of organized criminal syndi-
cates have little difficulty in posting bail, although, since crime is their way
of life, they are clearly dangerous.
"If a satisfactory solution could be found to the problem of the relatively
small percentage of defendants who present a significant risk of flight or
criminal conduct before trial, the Commission would be prepared to recom-
mend that money bail be totally discarded. Finding that solution is not easy.
Empowering magistrates to jail defendants they believe to be dangerous
might well create more of a problem than the imposition of money bail, in
the light of the difficulty of predicting dangerousness. Such a system also
might raise issues under State and Federal constitutional grants of a right
to bail, issues that have not been determined by the Supreme Court." NAT'L
Crras CoMM'N REPORT 131 (emphasis added).
165 The U.S. Children's Bureau, while suggesting that bail discriminates
against the poor, points out that "[i]n some jurisdictions . . . the right to
bail, provided for in the State Constitution, may extend to cases of delin-
quency. Furthermore, many persons are of the opinion that to leave no
avenue of release for the child is a denial of a basic right to which all per-
sons are entitled." STAmARs 63.
166 The time period in fact may be as long as 6 days. See text at note
153 supra.
167 In many counties, on every Monday a large number of children who
have been detained over the weekend are released without a petition being
filed or without a detention order being sought. In the absence of a bail
system no alternative to compel release exists.
168 CAL. W=. & INST'NS CODE § 630.
169 Ia.
may be given orally.
170
Existing procedures are defective in that they do not provide that
the minor be notified of the reasons for the probation officer's conclu-
sion that further "detention of minor is a matter of immediate and
urgent necessity for the protection of the person or property of an-
other,"'7' or that "the minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction .... ,172
Mr. Justice Fortas observed in Gauit that:
Due process of law requires notice of the sort we have described-that
is, notice which would be deemed constitutionally adequate in a civil
or criminal proceeding. It does not allow a hearing to be held in
which a youth's freedom and his parents' right to his custody are at
stake without giving them timely notice, in advance of the hearing,
of the specific issues that they must meet.'
73
While Gault dealt with the right to written notice of the nature
of the misconduct which the probation officer claimed gave the court
jurisdiction, the rationale is applicable to notification as to the facts
justifying detention. The law provides for a detention hearing, and
the right to a detention hearing is meaningless unless the minor is
placed in a position in which he can reasonably prepare for it.
Certain practical accommodations must be made to time schedules
which are beneficial to the minor. The detention hearing is held the
day following the date of the filing of the petition 74 Under these
circumstances, it is reasonable for the probation officer to notify the
parent or guardian orally of the time and place of the hearing.
If the minor is to be detained, the petition itself should contain a
"concise statement of facts"'1 75 to support the conclusion that deten-
tion is required. The probation officer should be required to deliver
a copy of the petition to the minor and his parent not later than the
time of the detention hearing.
Some time for preparation is provided by section 638, which re-
quires the court to continue the hearing for 1 day upon motion of the
minor or his parents. This provision is defective, however, in not re-
170 Id. The notice may be given by telephone. In re Patterson, 58 Cal.
2d 848, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10, 377 P.2d 74 (1962).
171 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 628.
172 Id. It is the existing practice in many counties for the probation
officer to prepare and file with the court and serve upon the minor and his
parents at the detention hearing a written statement of the reasons why
detention is necessary. However, the charging allegation may amount to
nothing more than a rubber stamped notice stating something such as: "'Said
custody and detention are matters of immediate and urgent necessity for the
protection and welfare of said minor . . . and should be continued for the
following reasons:. ..... 'for the protection of the person and property of
another and the community.'" In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 600, 603, 49
Cal. Rptr. 861, 863 (1966).
1'73 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).
174 CAL. WELF. & IN5T'NS CODE § 632.
175 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 656(f).
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quiring the court to so advise the minor. The 1 day limitation is too
short, and should be revised to provide for a continuance of 5 judicial
days or such lesser period of time as the minor may designate. In
this fashion an outer limit will be set and at the same time the minor
will have control over the period of continuance.
The Detention Hearing
The detention hearing under California practice has tended to be
pro forma. It frequently consisted of nothing more than a brief report
by the probation officer and a cursory review of the police report.
One salient change brought about by the 1967 amendments is the addi-
tion to section 630, which reads in part: "In . . . [the detention]
hearing the minor . . .has a right to confrontation by, and cross-
examination of, witnesses." This means that in a delinquency hearing
the probation officer will be required to present a prima facie case
that the minor committed the offense, since the "immediate and ur-
gent necessity" 176 for detention is necessarily premised upon this
assumption. This requirement for full evidentiary hearing, coupled
with provision for appointment of counsel, should, in and of itself, do




The statutory standard for detention is inadequate. It provides
that at the detention hearing the judge shall order the minor released
unless:
it appears that such minor has violated an order of the juvenile
court or has escaped from the commitment of the juvenile court or
that it is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the protec-
tion of such minor or the person or property of another that he be
detained or that such minor is likely to flee the jurisdiction of the
court .... 178
The "immediate and urgent necessity" test is hopelessly vague, and
provides no simple yardstick for the court to follow. Furthermore,
under present practice no attempt is made to determine whether
there is probable cause that the minor has committed the offense.
179
176 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 635.
177 See note 163 supra.
178 CAL. WELT. & INST'Ns CODE § 635 (emphasis added).
179 In Los Angeles County, the superior court manual specifically pro-
vides "[t] hat the minor at the detention hearing shall not be asked concerning
the truth of the allegations of the petitions except transients and potential
returnees to the Youth Authority." THE ExEcuTIvE OFFICE or THE Los ANGELES
SUPERIOR COURT, M-NUAL OF POLICIES AiD PROCEDURES, JUVENILE DEPARTMENTS
§ 15 (1966). This practice would appear to be changed by the addition of
CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 630 (b), which now provides for a right of con-
frontation by, and cross-examination of, witnesses at the detention hearing.
The New York Family Court Act provides a simple and straight-
forward test:
After the filing of a petition .. the court in its discretion may re-
lease the respondent or direct his detention. In exercising its discre-
tion . . the court shall not direct detention unless it finds that un-
less the respondent is detained:
(a) there is a substantial probability that he will not appear in
court on the return date; or
(b) there is a serious risk that he may before the return date do
an act which if committed by an adult would constitute a crime.' 8 0
This test is in accord with the recommendations of the Standard
Family Court Act. 1" The Illinois law goes further and requires a
finding of probable cause 8 2 and appears to require a full evidentiary
hearing as to that.1 3 While the New York Family Court Act is un-
clear on the subject it does require the adjudicatory hearing to com-
mence within 3 calendar days following the detention order, as con-
trasted to 15 judicial days in California.184 California appears to have
followed the lead of Illinois.
185
Appointment of Counsel
The Supreme Court said in Gault:
We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine de-
linquency which may result in a commitment to an institution in
which the juvenile's freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents
must be notified of the child's right to be represented by counsel
retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, that counsel
will be appointed to represent the child.186
The President's Commission on Crime went further and observed:
Counsel should be appointed as a matter of course wherever coer-
cive action is a possibility, without requiring any affirmative choice
by child or parent.
187
Immediate and urgent necessity in a section 602 case necessarily depends upon
the assumption that the offense was committed by the minor and upon
consideration of the surrounding circumstances. In the past, this was estab-
lished from the police report; now evidence will be required.
180 N.Y. FAMnLy CT. ACT § 739 (McKinney 1963).
181 STANDARD FAmVLy CT. ACT §§ 33-34.
182 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-6(1) (1965).
183 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-6 (1965); N.Y. F.my CT. ACT § 747
(McKinney Supp. 1967).
184 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CoDE § 657.
185 See note 179 supra.
186 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 41 (1967).
187 NAT'L CamwE COmM'N REPORnT 87. The Commission prefaced the fore-
going quotation by stating:
"Fears also have been expressed that the formality lawyers would bring
into juvenile court would defeat the therapeutic aims of the court. But in-
formality has no necessary connection with therapy; it is a device that has
been used to approach therapy, and it is not the only possible device. It is
quite possible that in many instances lawyers, for all their commitment to
formality, could do more to further therapy for their clients than can the
small, overworked social staffs of the courts. A lawyer-especially a poverty
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California has responded affirmatively to these suggestions. A
1967 amendment provides not only that counsel must upon request be
appointed for the indigent minor alleged to be a person described in
section 601 (delinquent tendencies) or 602 (delinquency),188 but
goes on to provide that:
[T]he court must appoint counsel for the minor if he appears at
the hearing without counsel, whether he is unable to afford counsel or
not, unless there is an intelligent waiver of the right of counsel. 8 9
In some cases a minor may make an intelligent waiver of the right to
counsel, but it may reasonably be anticipated that the very searching
process in which the court must engage to determine whether or not
a proposed waiver is intelligent will, in the normal case, result in the
minor's requesting appointment of counsel. Many minors will be in-
capable of making an intelligent waiver, and it may be reasonably
anticipated that appellate courts will be loath to find an intelligent
waiver if hindsight indicates that such a waiver was improvident on
the part of the minor. The practical effect should be to ensure that
all minors charged with delinquency are represented by counsel.
This proposition is illustrated by the recent case of In re Butter-
field.190 Following a suicide attempt in February of 1966, the minor
was charged as being a person coming within section 601, and was
made a ward of the court. After a second suicide attempt in 1967,
program or legal aid lawyer or other practitioner specializing in criminal
matters-is often familiar with the various rehabilitative and preventive pro-
grams and organizations available in his community. He might already know
the youngster's family or neighborhood. Thus he often would be, in other
words, in a position to assist the court in developing a plan of disposition and
treatment appropriate for the individual juvenile and, more important, in
seeing that it is carried out: in making the appointments and taking the other
specific steps that the press of business may force the probation officer to
leave to the reluctant child or his bewildered parents. There are not nearly
enough lawyers now with the skills to perform this role, but the fact that there
are some argues that there could be more if there were more calls for their
services. To suggest that lawyers perform these tasks is not to suggest that
they become social workers. It is to suggest that in many instances lawyers
can, and do, perform services for their clients that go beyond formal court
representation." Id. at 86.
For further discussion of the role of counsel and the need for counsel
in all proceedings, whether or not contested, see authorities collected in In re
Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-42, nn. 55-71 (1967). For a concurring social work view-
point, see Berg, Social Work Practice and the Trend Toward a Legalistic
Juvenile Court, SocIAL CASEWORK 94 (1966).
18s Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 2136, § 1, at 4445 (formerly Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns
Code § 634), provided that the court must upon request appoint counsel for
the indigent minor if he was accused of an offense which, if committed by
an adult, would constitute a felony, and otherwise made the appointment
discretionary.
189 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 634. In CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §
700, the same requirement is set forth in slightly different language.
190 253 A.C.A. 888, 61 Cal Rptr. 874, hearing denied, - A.C. ;. Cal.
Rptr. - (1967).
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a petition was filed under section 602, charging that the second suicide
attempt was a violation of the terms of probation imposed following
the section 601 adjudication in 1966. Before the hearing, both the
girl, who was 15, and her mother were advised of their right to
counsel, and waived that right. The court found full compliance with
the statutory requirement for warning of the right to counsel. The
girl admitted the second suicide attempt, and the juvenile court
promptly ordered her committed to the California Youth Authority.
The court of appeal held the waiver to be unintelligent because the
girl and her mother had not been specifically warned that long-term
confinement in a correctional institution was a possible consequence
of the order.191
Findings by the Court
The law should require the court to make specific findings as to
why it ordered the minor detained; at present it does not.1 92 Such
could easily be cast in one or two sentences beginning, "Detention
of the minor is a matter of immediate and urgent necessity for the pro-
tection of such minor or the person or property of another in that
.... " In the absence of any such findings, the court of appeal or the
supreme court, in a habeas corpus action to review the detention
order, 93 may be faced with great difficulty in determining the fac-
tual basis for detention.
Article 7-Commencement of Proceedings
Contents of the Petition
The significance of the petition would be substantially enhanced
if it were required that it contain a statement as to whether or not the
probation officer seeks to have physical custody of the minor removed
from his parents or other guardian.94 If the probation officer was
uncertain as to a dispositional recommendation at the time of the filing
of the petition, he could so state. The minor and his parent would be
immediately advised of the seriousness of the case as viewed by the
191 Compare People v. Lara, 67 A.C. 367, 62 Cal. Rptr. - (1967) in which
the supreme court held that a minor of 17 could waive his rights without
the advice of a friendly adult. It is significant that the hearing in Butter-
field was denied after the decision in Lara. Apparently the supreme court
will not show special consideration for the sophisticated juvenile offender
who has a long and extensive record, but will be sympathetic to the unso-
phisticated child who has suffered real prejudice through his waiver of rights.
192 In re Macidon, 240 Cal. App. 2d 600, 611, 49 Cal. Rptr. 861, 868 (1966).
193 Habeas corpus is the appropriate means of review. Id. at 606-07, 49
Cal. Rptr. at 865.
194 See CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 656 for requirements for the contents
of the petition.
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probation officer, and would respond accordingly. Such information
would also be of practical significance to the attorney in permitting
him to make a preliminary evaluation of the case, and would alert the
court beforehand so that it can consider the appropriateness of the
remedy.
Notice of the Jurisdictional Hearing
The Supreme Court stated in Gault that "[n]otice, to comply
with due process requirements, must be given sufficiently in advance
of scheduled court proceedings so that reasonable opportunity to pre-
pare will be afforded. . . ."195 Prior to Gault California had required
only 24 hours notice of the jurisdictional hearing. 9 6 In response to
the mandate of Gault a 1967 amendment to the Juvenile Court Law
requires that the minor and his family be given 10 days notice of the
hearing if the minor is not detained,197 or 5 days notice if the minor is
detained unless the hearing is set for a shorter period of time, in
which event at least 24 hours notice must be given.19  Since cases
normally are set for hearing at or near the last allowable date, the
practical effect will be to provide longer notice in most cases.
Furthermore, it is now made mandatory rather than permissive
that the court continue the hearing to appoint counsel, or to enable
counsel to acquaint himself with the case, or to provide reasonable
opportunity for the minor and his parent or guardian to prepare for
the hearing. 99
Another 1967 amendment requires the clerk, upon timely request,
to notify counsel of hearings in the same manner notice is furnished
to the parent or child. 200 The clerk must, as a matter of course, fur-
nish the minor's counsel, if known, with a copy of the petition.20'
Informal Dispositions and Preliminary Conferences
Most delinquency matters referred to the probation department
do not go to court. In 1965, 49.6 percent of all initial referrals were
closed by the probation department or referred to another agency,
and another 13.6 percent of the cases were placed under informal
supervision with no petition. having been filed.20 2 A petition was filed
195 In -re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967).
198 Cal. Stats. 1961, ch. 1616, § 2, at 3459 (formerly Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns
Code § 660).
197 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 660.
198 Id.
'99 CAL. WEL. & INST'NS CODE § 700.
200 CAL. WEL'F. & INST'NS CODE § 630.1.
201 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 658.
202 CAL. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, Cmnuv AND DELINQUENCY IN CALwoRNiA, 1965,
at 164 (1966).
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in only 36.8 percent of the cases.20 3
The first step in the intake proceedings is for the probation officer
to confer with the minor, his parents and other interested persons.
Some cases at that point are dismissed for lack of evidence. Others
are disposed of on the basis that it will be sufficient for the probation
officer to admonish and dismiss the minor. Some counties make fre-
quent use of programs of informal supervision of the minor in lieu
of the filing of a petition;204 others make virtually none.20 5
The President's Commission, recognizing the stigmatizing effect
of juvenile court referrals, 20 6 has suggested that youth service bureaus
be established.20 7 These agencies would act as central co-ordinators
of all community services for young people, and would also provide
services lacking in the community or neighborhood, especially services
that are designed for less serious delinquents. The police, schools and
other concerned agencies would normally refer minors first to the
youth service bureau, which would provide central diagnosing and co-
ordinating services.
Unless and until youth service bureaus are established (which
appears unlikely in the absence of federal funding) the intake pro-
cedures of the probation department will continue to fill this role by
default..2 0 8 The President's Commission recognizes that today it is the
juvenile court
where problems of lack of accurate, up-to-date information about
needs and alternatives; lack of co-ordination among available serv-
ices; and lack of systematic ways to bring the juvenile and the service
together are particularly acute.2 09
The Commission recommends:
To meet those difficulties, the court intake function of pre-judicial
disposition should be more systematically employed and more for-
mally recognized and organized. Written guides and standards should
be formulated and imparted in the course of inservice training.
Staff resources should be augmented where necessary to keep abreast
of service opportunities and programs in the community and to make
inquiries into the backgrounds of juveniles sufficiently comprehensive
to select intelligently amongst alternatives.2 10
Both the Illinois2 11 and the New York -12 law provide for prelimi-
203 Id.
204 Id. E.g., Los Angeles, 22.2%; Sacramento, 13.8%; Placer, 54.4%; Fresno,
16.6%.
205 Id. E.g., San Diego, 1.1%; San Francisco, 2.1%; San Joaquin, 0.5%.
206 NAT'L CamnE CoM'N REPORT 85.
207 Id. at 83.
208 The juvenile probation department frequently is utilized by lower
class families as a source of child guidance. Middle class families, on the
other hand, normally would turn to a child psychiatric clinic, a family service
agency, or some other professional for counselling.
209 NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT 84.
210 Id.
211 ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § -703-8 (.1965).
212 N.Y. FAMILY CT. ACT § 734 (McKinney 1963).
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nary conferences attended by court personnel, the juvenile, parents,
and other involved parties to resolve grievances without adjudica-
tion.213 While such procedures are used in California, they have not
been systematized, organized, or specifically provided for in the juve-
nile court law.214 This should be done.
The President's Commission on Crime notes that:
Safeguards essential to such a procedure are that it occur within a
specifically limited time, to eliminate the indirect coercion of an in-
definite threat that a petition will be filed at some later date, and
that use of statements made at the conference be inadmissible in sub-
sequent court proceedings.
21 5
Both the Illinois21 6 and the New York217 laws so provide. Such
amendment also is necessary in our juvenile court law. Free com-
munication between the minor and his family and the probation offi-
cer is impeded when statements made in the course of attempting to
obtain an informal disposition may be used against the minor in court.
A frequent impediment to voluntary disposition through confer-
ence in California is the requirement that a petition must be filed for
the minor to be detained for more than 48 hours.2 18 Counsel often
is appointed only after the petition has been filed. At this point the
probation officer may take the position that the filing of the petition
precludes informal disposition.2 19  The law should be amended to
make it explicit that the probation officer has the power without the
consent of the court to dismiss the petition at any time prior to adjudi-
cation by the court.
The President's Commission on Crime also suggests:
Juvenile courts should make fullest feasible use of preliminary con-
ferences to dispose of cases short of adjudication.
Juvenile courts should employ consent decrees wherever possible to
213 See Note, Juvenile Delinquents: The Police, State Courts, and Indi-
vidualized Justice, 79 HARV. L. REV. 775, 787-90 (1966); Note, Rights and
Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLum. L. REV. 281, 289-310 (1967).
214 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 654 does provide:
"In any case in which a probation officer, after investigation of an appli-
cation for petition or other investigation he is authorized to make, concludes
that a minor is within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or will probably
soon be within such jurisdiction, he may, in lieu of filing a petition, and with
consent of the minor's parent or guardian, undertake a program of supervi-
sion of the minor, for not to exceed six months, and attempt thereby to adjust
the situation which brings the minor within the jurisdiction of the court or
creates the probability that he will soon be within such jurisdiction. Nothing
in this section shall be construed to prevent the probation officer from filing
a petition at any time within said six-month period."
215 NAT'L CRIME ComvLm'N REPORT 84.
216 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-8(5) (1965).
217 N.Y. FAiVIILY CT. ACT § 735 (McKinney Supp. 1967).
218 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 631. See text at note 151 supra.
219 This has frequently occurred in the writer's experience in the City
and County of San Francisco.
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avoid adjudication while still settling juvenile cases and treating of-
fenders.220
Section 654 permits the probation officer at the present time to
undertake informal programs of supervision for a period not to ex-
ceed 6 months. In order to encourage the use of such programs it
would seem desirable to increase the maximum duration to 1 year.
It also appears desirable to adopt the safeguard recommended by the
President's Commission of requiring court approval of such consent
decrees.
221
A statutory directive providing for the use of settlement confer-
ences and consent decrees whenever possible should be adopted.
While some counties make substantial use of the existing procedures,
others have made little use of them222 and should be encouraged to do
so by means of such a directive.
Article 8-Hearings and Transfer
Separate Hearings
Section 675 provides in part: "No person on trial, awaiting trial,
or under accusation of crime, other than a parent, guardian, or relative
of the minor, shall be permitted to be present at any . . . session
[of the juvenile court] except as a witness." Does this provision pro-
hibit the joinder of causes in the juvenile court? Frequently the case
of a number of minors involved together in the same offense is heard
at the same time. Clarification would seem desirable.
As a matter of policy it is suggested that joinder be permitted
during the adjudicatory phase of the hearing, and while the circum-
stances of the offense and the degree of participation of each of the
minors is being determined. But the case of each minor should be
heard separately in the dispositional phase.22 3 The nature of juvenile
court proceedings is such that family matters of a highly confidential
nature are likely to be revealed at the dispositional hearing, and the
objectives of privacy are destroyed if these facts are disclosed to a
minor's friends and to their parents.
Pre-hearing Discovery
The law is silent as to the right of the minor to engage in dis-
covery. It can be argued that the full range of discovery procedures
provided for in the Code of Civil Procedure are available in juvenile
220 NAT'L CRivE Com1V'N REPORT 84.
221 Id.
222 See notes 204 and 205 supra.
223 This is the recommendation of the U.S. Children's Bureau. STrAcm-
AmDs 77.
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court cases because they are civil proceedings. 224 Yet the very limited
period of time available in the processing of a juvenile court case and
the quasi-criminal nature of juvenile court proceedings make it of
dubious wisdom to make the full range of discovery of civil cases
available. Since the minor possesses a privilege against self-incrim-
ination,225 discovery in delinquency cases necessarily would be a
virtually one-way affair.
Specific provision should be made for discovery at least as broad
in scope as that currently provided in the criminal courts. This would
include the right of the minor to obtain such things as copies of his
own statements, statements of the prosecution's witnesses, statements
used by the probation officer to impeach the minor's witnesses, names
and addresses of eyewitnesses known to the probation officer, and
notes used by the police officer in preparing his police report.226
Accepting an Admission of the Charges
The hearing customarily begins with the court, after warning the
minor of his rights, asking whether or not the minor admits the alle-
gations of the petition. If the allegations are admitted, the court then
proceeds to a dispositional hearing; if not, an adjudicatory hearing
takes place.
The age of the persons with whom the juvenile court deals, their
lack of sophistication, and their often culturally deprived background
are such that solicitous care ought to be exercised to insure that the ju-
venile recognizes the full consequences of admitting commission of
the offense, and that he in fact did commit the offense with which he
is charged. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure as amended in
1966 wisely established the following requirement in accepting pleas
in adult criminal cases:
A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty or, with the consent of
the court, nolo contendere. The court may refuse to accept a plea of
guilty and shall not accept such plea or a plea of nolo contendere
without first addressing the defendant personally and determining that
the plea is made voluntarily with understanding of the nature of the
charge and the consequences of the plea. If a defendant refuses to
plead or if the court refuses to accept a plea of guilty or if a defend-
224 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 2016-36 deal with depositions and discovery
in actions. CAL. CODE Civ. Paoc. § 2035 provides that the word "action" is
to be construed, whenever necessary to do so, as including a special proceed-
ing of a civil nature. CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 24 states that there are only two
kinds of actions: civil and criminal. Since juvenile court proceedings are
expressly declared not to be criminal (CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 503),
they must be civil.
225 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 630(b), 702.5.
226 See generally 1 CALiFoaA CamvnwAL PRACTICE 147-175 (Cal. Cont.
Educ. Bar ed. 1964) for a discussion of the scope of discovery in criminal
cases under California law.
ant corporation fails to appear, the court shall enter a plea of not
guilty. The court shall not enter a judgment upon a plea of guilty
unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.227
The same rule should be adopted in juvenile court cases.
Right of Trial by Jury
The Supreme Court of California held in 1924 in In re Daedler228
that there is no constitutional right to trial by jury in juvenile court
cases in California. Gault undermines the rationale of this decision.
In determining that there is no constitutional right to trial by
jury the court in Daedler began with the premise that "[i]n order to
[make] a determination of these contentions, it will be necessary to
review briefly the history and philosophy of juvenile court laws.
'229
The court then went on with a classic statement of the philosophy and
background of the juvenile court law as it was known in 1924, premis-
ing the law upon the doctrine of parens patriae. The court quoted
from an earlier case:
The action of the police judge here in question did not amount to a
criminal prosecution, nor to proceedings against the minor according
to the course of the common law, in which the right of trial by jury
is guaranteed. The purpose in view is not punishment for offenses
done, but reformation and training of the child to habits of industry,
with a view to his future usefulness when he shall have been re-
claimed to society, or shall have attained his majority.
230
Referring to practices in other jurisdictions, the court in Daedler
noted:
[W]hile, as we have stated, there was some disposition in the earlier
decisions of the courts of certain states to give strict application of the
constitutional safeguards of trial by jury and due process of law to
proceedings before the juvenile courts, and to hold that the proceed-
ings in the cases of minors brought before such courts were criminal
in their nature, the main trend of modern [pre-1924] authority has
been away from this viewpoint .... 231
The President's Commission teaches us that "[t]he juvenile court
is a court of law, charged like other agencies of criminal justice to pro-
tecting the community against threatening conduct."232 It points out
that "[]uvenile court laws and procedures that can be rationalized
solely on the basis of the original optimistic theories endure as if the
227 FED. R. CRan. P. 11 (emphasis added).
228 194 Cal. 320, 228 P. 467 (1924), overruling Ex parte Becknell, 119 Cal.
496, 51 P. 692 (1897). See also Ex parte Ah Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876); In re
Brodie, 33 Cal. App. 751, 166 P. 605 (1917); In re Shinn, 195 Cal. App. 2d 683,
16 Cal. Rptr. 165 (1961).
229 194 Cal. at 324, 228 P. at 469.
230 In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 325, 228 P. 467, 469 (1924), quoting Ex
parte Ah Peen, 51 Cal. 280 (1876).
231 In re Daedler, 194 Cal. 320, 328, 228 P. 467, 470 (1924).
232 NAT'L CRmIE COMM'N REPORT 81 (emphasis added).
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vitality of those theories were undiluted.123 3 The searching analysis
of Justice Fortas in Gault demonstrates, too, that the parens patriae
doctrine endorsed by the court is "murky" and "its historic credentials
are of dubious relevance.."234 Due process for the juvenile is now a
constitutional right.
A complete re-evaluation by the Supreme Court of California of
the constitutional right to trial by jury in delinquency cases will be
required.235 The question is not free from doubt. The court may well
be influenced by the recommendation by the Delinquency Task Force
Report that trial by jury is undesirable in juvenile court cases, 236 and
permit Daedler to stand even though its foundations have been un-
dermined.
Almost all juvenile court judges,237 referees and probation offi-
cers take the position that trial by jury as a matter of policy is unde-
sirable in juvenile court cases.238  On the other hand, many public
defenders and other experienced juvenile court defense counsel inter-
viewed by the writer have indicated a strong desire for the right to
trial by jury.2 39 They claim that there is a strong tendency on the
part of juvenile court judges and referees to sustain jurisdiction
whenever any evidence exists upon which such a finding would be
upheld by an appellate court, on the theory that no harm could come
to the minor from the juvenile court's taking jurisdiction, and that the
minor needs the treatment available from the juvenile court. Many
feel that the juvenile court judge may be influenced by extrajudicial
confessions of the minor which would not have been admissible in the
adult courts.240 The tendency of the juvenile court judge to sustain
233 Id.
284 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967).
235 For a strong argument that the right to trial by jury is a constitu-
tional right in the juvenile court, see Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juve-
nile Courts, 46 CoRwELL L.Q. 387, 399-400 (1961). State courts are split on the
subject. See cases collected in Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965). The right
to trial by jury generally has been afforded only when the minor is charged
with some specific crime.
236 DEL. TAsR FORCE REPORT 38.
237 Cf. STANDARDs 73. But see Gardner, The Juvenile Court, CAL. S.B.J.
349 (1965).
238 The U.S. Children's Bureau suggests that juries are incompatible with
"the informal setting of the court hearings." STANDARDS 73. This presupposes
that a contested jurisdictional hearing with the minor represented by counsel
can, or should, be informal.
239 It may be doubted whether introducing provisions for the right to
trial by jury in fact would result in frequent jury trials in the juvenile court.
In Denver, where jury trials have been permitted for 25 years, there have
been only two requests, both withdrawn before trial. Note, Juvenile De-
linquents: The Police, State Courts, and Individualized Justice, 79 HAnv. L.
REV. 775, 793-94 (1966).
240 "Apart from the question of constitutional requirements, trial by jury
should be provided as a matter of policy for those who desire it as a pro-
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jurisdiction may well be subconsciously promoted by the practice of
many juvenile court judges of reading the social report on the minor
before the jurisdictional hearing has begun.241 With the right to jury
trial withdrawn and the "preponderance of evidence" test prevail-
ing,
2 4 2 obtaining dismissal of the petition can be difficult indeed.
The right to trial by jury in criminal cases is considered to be
such a basic right as to be guaranteed in both the federal243 and
state244 constitutions. So long as this right is cherished by adults,
who are unwilling to surrender it, it should likewise be made available
to our children.
245
Tests for Admissibility of Evidence in the Adjudicatory Hearing
Section 701 provides:
At the hearing, the court shall first consider only the question
whether the minor is a person described by Sections 600, 601, or 602,
and for this purpose, any matter or information relevant and material
to the circumstances or acts which are alleged to bring him within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court is admissible and may be re-
ceived in evidence ....
The intent of section 701 is clear from the report of the Governor's
tection against jaded judges who hear case after case, day in and day out, and
decide on past prejudices rather than present evidence. Also present is the
previously discussed problem of excluding illegal or coerced confessions. Un-
der current procedures the same judge who must decide the case is also
asked to rule on the legality of the confession. Of course, in an ordinary
criminal case tried by a judge without jury, he might be asked to do the
same thing. But in a criminal case the defendant chooses whether trial will
be by jury. If he fears prejudice in having the trier of fact hear the con-
fession, even if it is eventually proved illegal, he may protect himself by
asking for a jury. The danger of this kind of prejudice would seem to be
most substantial where the litigant does not claim actual coercion but merely
that the confession was obtained under illegal circumstances. This problem
could be solved by the use of pre-trial procedures to exclude illegal confes-
sions, using a system of rotating judges so that the same man does not sit on
both the pre-trial and the fact-finding hearings. Of course in the many areas
where there are only one-judge juvenile courts, judges from the regular legal
system would be required to hear the pre-trial claims concerning illegal
confession. The need for these complicated procedures could be obviated
by offering trial by jury. It should be noted also that while a two-judge pro-
cedure could effectively exclude an illegal confession from consideration by
the trier of fact, it does not satisfy the concern raised about prejudiced or
jaded judges." Comment, Criminal Offenders in the Juvenile Court: More
Brickbats and Another Proposal, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 1171, 1187-88 (1966).
241 See text at notes 260-63 infra.
242 See text at notes 253-54 infra.
243 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
244 See Annot., 100 A.L.R.2d 1241 (1965); CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
245 The writer wishes to emphasize that he is not suggesting that the
minor or counsel ought to make use of the right to trial by jury. This is a
decision which must be made upon a case-by-case basis. The question is one
of the availability of the right, to be intelligently waived or not by the
minor on a case-by-case basis as he believes best serves his interests.
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Commission.246  All relevant and material evidence, including the
incompetent, may be received by the court at the adjudicatory hear-
ing.247 However, the court in making its decision is to sift the evi-
dence, cast the incompetent from its mind, and rely only upon the
competent. Such a proposal may have made sense to those accus-
tomed to a juvenile court in which minors were seldom represented
by counsel, but makes none in this day and age where most minors
are represented by counsel and the district attorney may appear for
the probation officer.
248
The compromise which Section 701 represents is highly prejudi-
cial to the minor. It is unrealistic to assume that the judge can drive
all incompetent testimony from his mind. It is more reasonable to
assume that the unconscious pattern of judicial thinking will involve
the court first coming to a decision, and then sifting the evidence to
see if there is sufficient competent evidence to support that decision.
The possible prejudice involved outweighs any advantage to be
gained through informality.249
The fear of loss of informality is illusory. Contested jurisdic-
tional hearings normally cannot be informal. Informality is not pro-
moted by the law even in its present state. Counsel must object at
each point at which incompetent evidence is offered in order to obtain
a ruling from the court that this evidence, while being received, will
not be considered. The relaxed rules generally followed in nonjury
cases provide as much informality as is consistent with due process.
It should be noted that the Supreme Court in Gault quoted with
approval the recommendations of the Children's Bureau's Standards
for Juvenile and Family Courts that only competent, material and
relevant evidence should be admitted.250 In Illinois the rules of evi-
246 CAL. Juv. JUSTICE Comm'N-PART I, at 30.
247 It has been held that the probation officer's report is itself evidence.
In re Patterson, 58 Cal. 2d 848, 27 Cal. Rptr. 10, 377 P.2d 74 (1962); In re
Garcia, 201 Cal. App. 2d 662, 20 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1962); In re Halamuda, 85
Cal. App. 2d 219, 192 P.2d 781 (1948). Under the rationale of these cases it
is possible for the court to consider hearsay, weigh it, come to its decision,
and then merely search the record to determine whether sufficient evidence
can be found to support a decision against attack on appeal.
For arguments against the court's even seeing the probation officer's
report prior to dispositional hearing, see text at notes 260-63 infra. This
practice is condemned by the Advisory Council of Judges of the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency. ADVISORY COUNCIL OF JUDGES FOR THE
NATIONAL CouNciL ON CPmvm AND DELiNQUENCY, PROCEDURE AND EVIDENCE IN
THE JuvENnE COURT, GUIDE FOR JUDGES (1962).
248 For a discussion of the role of the district attorney in delinquency
determinations, see text at notes 129-30 supra.
249 See generally Note, Admission and Use of Evidence in the California
Juvenile Courts, 18 HASTNGS L.J. 668 (1967).
250 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1967).
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dence in the nature of civil proceedings in the state are applicable to
juvenile court proceedings.2 51
Standard of Proof
The standard of proof in juvenile court cases is regulated by sec-
tion 701:
[A] preponderance of evidence, legally admissible in the trial of
criminal cases, must be adduced to support a finding that the minor
is a person described by Section 602, and a preponderance of evi-
dence, legally admissible in the trial of civil cases must be adduced
to support a finding that the minor is a person described by Sections
600 or 601.
Consideration should now be given to changing the standard of
proof in delinquency cases to the criminal law standard of proof be-
yond a reasonable doubt.252  The only real justification for applying
a lesser standard of proof in the juvenile court is the unjustified as-
sumption that the "treatment" process always may be presumed to
be more helpful than harmful and that the jurisdictional hearing is
nothing more than a formality in the road to curing the child.2 53 This
line of reasoning is discredited by both the report of the President's
Commission 254 and by Gault.265 If the general pattern of the minor's
life is such that serious risk exists that he will become a delinquent,
an independent basis for jurisdiction may well exist under section 601.
If, however, the entire hearing is focused solely upon whether or not
the minor admitted a specific act no justification can exist for requir-
ing a lesser standard of proof of commission of that act in the juvenile
court than in the adult courts.
It should be borne in mind that the question is one of how much
evidence should be required to force the minor to submit to the juris-
diction of the juvenile court. It may well be that the "treatment" the
court affords would be of benefit to the minor whether or not he com-
mitted the act. Hopefully, if this is the case, some informal adjudica-
tion can be reached that will result in the minor being placed in the
hands of some treatment offering facility in the community. The
reality of the situation is that the question frequently is not whether
the minor is to be treated, but rather whether society is to remove him
to a "reform school" for its own protection. Adults for their own
251 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 704-6 (1965).
252 The U.S. Children's Bureau recommends the "clear and convincing"
proof test as a middle ground. STANDARDS 72.
253 It is frequently attempted to justify the "preponderance" test in terms
of the proceedings being not criminal. This approach does nothing more than
continue the gap between rhetoric and reality. The consideration should be
one of rationale, not labels.
254 NAT'L CRIME COMM'N REPORT 85.
255 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1967).
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protection demand proof beyond a reasonable doubt, and our children
are entitled to equal protection.
Bifurcation of the Hearing
The juvenile court hearing is bifurcated.25 6 First the court con-
siders whether or not it has jurisdiction over the minor,25 7 i.e.
whether the minor committed the offense charged. After determin-
ing that it has jurisdiction the court receives the social study and
determines what disposition should be made of the minor.258  The
court may, but need not, postpone the jurisdictional hearing until an-
other day to receive the social study of the probation officer or to re-
ceive other evidence.
259
Provision should be made for a mandatory continuance of the dis-
positional hearing if desired by the minor. Time and effort is re-
quired to properly prepare for the dispositional hearing, and counsel
frequently should not be forced to undertake the time and expense
involved to do so while jurisdiction still is in question. Furthermore,
a good atmosphere for a dispositional hearing cannot exist with the
testimony of the witnesses on jurisdiction still ringing in the ears of
the court and the parties present. A "cooling off" period generally
is desirable.
Premature Delivery of the Social Study
Section 702 implies that the court will not receive the social study
until after jurisdiction has been determined.260  The Task Force Re-
port on Delinquency observed:
The juvenile judge's use of social investigatory reports on the
child's background and history is indispensable to sound and informed
dispositional decisions. To minimize the danger that adjudication will
be affected by inappropriate considerations, however, social investi-
gation reports should not be made known to the judge in advance of
adjudication. Adoption of the bifurcated hearing and imposition of
legislative evidentiary regulations should help to meet the challenge
the exparte and confidential nature of these reports has presented to
maintenance of fair procedures.261
256 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE §§ 701, 702.
257 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 701.
25S CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 702.
259 Id.
260 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 702 provides in part: 'Prior to [hearing
evidence on the question of the proper disposition to be made of the minor,
the court] . . .may continue the hearing, if necessary, to receive the social
study of the probation officer ......
261 DEL. TASK FoRcE REPORT 35. This viewpoint is supported by all au-
thority found by the author, including the U.S. Children's Bureau. STANDARDS
73, quoting with approval, Note, Employment of Social Investigation Reports
in Criminal Juvenile Proceedings, 58 COLmV. L. REV. 702, 723 (1958); Note,
Correct Use of Background Reports in Juvenile Delinquency Cases, 5 SYRA-
CUSE L. REV. 67 (1953).
Nevertheless, one of the consultants' papers to the Task Force
Report on Delinquency reports reveals:
Bifurcated hearings were made mandatory in California in 1961 as
part of a wholesale revision of its juvenile court law, but according to
a 1965 survey by the author, a majority of judges (67 percent) con-
tinue to read the dispositional (social) report before jurisdictional
hearings. 262
The probation officer should be expressly prohibited from fur-
nishing, and the judge from receiving or reading, the probation report
until such time as an adjudication has been made. Along the same
lines, the probation officer should be prohibited from discussing any
case ex parte with the court, as occurs all too frequently under the
existing system.263 In order to insulate the judge it will be neces-
sary for the minor to be tried by a judge other than the one who heard
the detention hearing if the minor was detained. That judge will
have already received much of this information.
The Dispositional Hearing
The probation officer is required to prepare for every dispositional
hearing a social study of the minor, containing such matters as may
be relevant to a proper disposition of the case.264 The social study
must include the probation officer's recommendation for disposition
of the case.265
In re Halamuda266 held that the unverified contents of the pro-
bation officer's report, though based on hearsay, were required to be
regarded as legal evidence, on which the court could decide the case,
on the theory that such a report was an official document and became
a judicial record to be considered in deciding the case. Section 702 im-
plies that the social study of the probation officer is evidence.267 Yet
the report of the probation officer often is hearsay in its rankest form.
The Supreme Court in Gault specifically declined to rule as to whether
hearsay could be used as evidence at the disposition hearing.266
262 PRESIDENT'S Coivm'N ON LAw ENFORCEMENT & ADINISTRATION or
JUSTICE, SELECTED CONSULTANTS' PAPERS 101 (1967).
263 Compare A.B.A., CANONS or PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS, Canon
17, at 49 (1957):
"A judge should not permit private interviews, arguments or communi-
cations designed to influence his judicial action; where interests to be af-
fected thereby are not represented before him, except in cases where provi-
sion is made by law for ex parte application."
264 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 602.
265 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 582.
266 In re Halamuda, 85 Cal. App. 2d 219, 192 P.2d 781 (1948).
267 The court may continue the hearing "to receive the social study of
the probation officer or to receive other evidence ... " CAL. WELT. & INST'NS
CODE § 702 (emphasis added).
268 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 13, 31 n.48 (1967).
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No easy solution to this problem can be presented. In most cases
the factual content of the probation officer's report will not be subject
to substantial challenge, and dispute will revolve around the in-
ferences to be drawn from the facts set forth. Nevertheless, disputes
frequently do arise as to the accuracy or truthfulness of the hearsay
set forth in the report. As a middle ground, it is suggested that the
probation officer's report maintain its evidentiary status at the
dispostional hearing, but that it be made clear that the probation
officer, upon request, must produce as a witness any person whose
statement is contained in the probation officer's report.269  In that
event the testimony should supersede the report. Hopefully such
provision would meet any tests later laid down by the Supreme Court.
Transfer to the Adult Courts
Section 707 provides in part:
At any time during a hearing upon a petition alleging that a
minor is, by reason of violation of any criminal statute or ordinance,
a person described in Section 602, when substantial evidence has
been adduced to support a finding that the minor was 16 years of age
or older at the time of the alleged commission of such offense and
that the minor would not be amenable to the care, treatment and
training program available through the facilities of the juvenile
court,. . . the court may make a finding ... that the minor is not a
fit and proper subject to be dealt with under this chapter, and the
court shall direct the district attorney or other appropriate prose-
cuting officer to prosecute the person under the applicable criminal
statute or ordinance ....
Two problems are encountered by the practicing lawyer in questions
of transfer: the vagueness of the standards for transfer and the lack
of adequate notice.
270
269 This is the prevailing practice in most counties in California, and is
implicit in the law. The minor and his parents have a right to receive the
probation report. CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 827.
270 For a comprehensive discussion of the problems involved based on a
widespread observation, see Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile
Courts, 67 COLmV. L. Rzv. 281, 313-20 (1967). The note writers point out that
two approaches are taken by juvenile court judges towards transfer which
they characterize for convenience as the jurisdictional and dispositional
models:
"The two broad approaches which juvenile court judges take toward
transfer can for convenience be termed the jurisdictional and dispositional
models. The former regards transfer as a device for fixing the jurisdiction of
the juvenile court. Recognizing that age-the only statutory criterion upon
which juvenility is assessed-is not alone a sufficient standard for determining
whether the youth will be amenable to treatment in the juvenile courts, judges
adopting this approach view transfer as a device which weeds out those who
are juvenile in age but not in attitude. The dispositional view denies the
premise that a youth can be too mature to profit from special treatment; the
statutory age limit fixes, beyond question, the class of persons who are re-
habilitable. Under this view, transfer is dictated not merely by the youth's
characteristics but also by extrinsic factors. The youth must be transferred
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The standard is a hopelessly vague one: " [ T] hat the minor would
not be amenable to the care, treatment and training program available
through the facilities of the juvenile court." The Governor's Com-
mission noted the absence of clear standards as one of the several
major problems that seriously impede the efficient administration of
juvenile justice in California.
271
The quantitative extent of the transfer problem will be greatly
increased as a result of 1967 legislation which permits transfer in any
case involving a minor 16 or 17 charged with an offense which, if com-
mitted by an adult, would constitute a crime.272 Until that amend-
ment, transfer was permitted only if a minor was charged with an
offense which, if committed by an adult, would amount to a felony.
273
Standards. The 1967 amendment is of some help in providing
that the probation officer must provide the court with a social report
covering the minor.274 This provision itself will be of some benefit
in bringing professional testimony to the court, but still does not pro-
vide clear-cut guidance for the court.
One helpful step would be to provide for a statutory presumption
that any minor of 16 or 17 is amenable to the care, treatment and
training program available through the facilities of the juvenile court.
Another approach would be to provide that a case cannot be trans-
ferred to the adult court unless some attempt has been made in the
past to treat the minor through the facilities of the juvenile court.
In most cases, the critical question facing the court will be
whether the minor is amenable to the program of treatment available
through the Youth Authority. This is particularly true in the case of
murder or other crimes of great violence against the person in which
removal of the minor from his own home is almost a foregone conclu-
sion. The logical solution to this situation would be to provide that
the court must, at the request of the minor, commit the minor to the
Youth Authority for the purpose of having the Youth Authority itself
make the determination if the minor is amenable to their treatment
program. No one can be in a better position to make that determina-
not simply because he is an advanced criminal, but because the state has
failed to provide the necessary juvenile facilities to help him. It is evident
from this conceptual distinction that the jurisdictional and dispositional judges
will consult different factors and pursue divergent methods of social analysis
in determining whether to transfer a case to the criminal court." (Footnotes
omitted).
271 CAL. Juv. JusTIcE COMM'N-PART I, at 12.
272 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707.
273 Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 534, § 1, at 1850 (formerly Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns
Code § 707).
274 "The court shall cause the probation officer to investigate and submit
a report on the behavioral patterns of the person being considered for un-
fitness." CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 707.
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tion. Only through this means can a uniform standard be established
throughout the state as to which minors are not fit for committal to
the Youth Authority.
Notice. Gault establishes that minors are entitled to reasonable
notice in juvenile court proceedings and to an opportunity to pre-
pare.27  The law is strangely silent in providing no notice to the
minor, his family and counsel if the question of transfer is to be con-
sidered. By inference, some provision for notice will be created by
the fact that the probation officer is required to investigate and file
a social report for consideration by the court. It would be desirable
to set up specific provisions for notice. Furthermore, since the con-
cept of our juvenile court law is that the court shall act as a judicial
check on the administrative system, it would appear appropriate to
leave it to the probation officer to be the one to initiate the request
for transfer.
The inherent risk of transfer undoubtedly will loom in the back-
ground as a threat in all juvenile court cases involving minors of 16
and 17. Counsel will be hesitant to cooperate with the probation
officer out of fear that statements made by the minor later will be
used against him in a criminal prosecution. One solution is to pro-
vide that transfer cannot be ordered once the jurisdictional hearing
has been concluded. Another approach would be to follow the lead
of Illinois2 76 and New York2 77 and to provide that no evidence devel-
oped in the juvenile court may be used in criminal proceedings upon
transfer.
Double Jeopardy.
Section 707 was amended in 1965 to provide that a minor who is
committed to the Youth Authority, and later returned by the Youth
Authority as unamenable to treatment, could have the case against
him dismissed and be transferred to the adult courts for prosecution
there. This provision directly contravenes the recommendations
of the Governor's Commission,278 and reinstates a vice that was cured
in the 1961 revision of the law. It represents double jeopardy in its
clearest form. This procedure was upheld in People v. Silverstein
279
275 In Te Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1967).
276 See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-9 (1965).
277 See N.Y. FAmnmy CT. ACT § 783 (McKinney 1963).
278 "There are several cases on record where juveniles have been tried and
sentenced in a criminal court for an offense upon which final judgment was
previously made in the juvenile court. Such a course of action, while rare,
is unfortunately permissible under the present juvenile court law.
"In an adult case, this is prohibited because it would constitute placing
the individual in double jeopardy. The Commission sees no valid reason why
juveniles, as well, should not be protected from such proceedings." CAL. Juv.
JusricE CormnW'N-PART I, at 24.
279 121 Cal. App. 2d 140, 262 P.2d 656 (1953).
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on the theory that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal. The
validity of this rationale has been undermined by Gault, and the ques-
tion should now be considered open. In any event, protection against
double jeopardy is a fundamental right of adults, and in fairness
should be extended to juveniles by revision of this section.
Article 9-Judgments and Orders
Dismissal of the Petition
The judge should be given the power to determine at the conclu-
sion of the dispositional hearing that the best interests of the minor
will be served by dismissing the petition "in the interests of justice. '280
This dispositional alternative already is used by many juvenile courts
in California.28 1 The power of the court to use it ought to be made
explicit.
In addition, following the model of other states, dispositional
alternation could be expanded to permit reduction of the offense
charged or continuance of the dispositional hearing for a period of
months, with dismissal if the minor appears to have been rehabilitated
in the interim.
Commitment to Juvenile Hall
The Governor's Commission did not include commital to the juve-
nile hall as one of the dispositional alternatives available to the
court.282 The legislature, however, provided that until the 91st day
after final adjournment of the 1965 regular session of the legislature
"if there is no county juvenile home, ranch, camp, or forestry camp
within the county, the court may commit the minor to the county ju-
venile hall for a period not to exceed three months."2 3  In 1965284
this exemption was extended for another 2-year period. In 1967 it
was made permanent and the 3-month limitation was removed.285
Juvenile halls are not designed or equipped to provide a program
of rehabilitation for minors. They are designed only for short-term
280 Cf. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 704-7 (1965), which provides for contin-
uance under supervision. The New York Family Court Act permits the court
to suspend judgment for not more than one year subject to conditions which
the court may impose. All these mechanisms recognize that it is desirable to
avoid having the minor obtain a juvenile court record with its stigmatic effect
and that not all children require supervision.
-81 See Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the Juvenile Courts, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 281, 291-92 (1967).
282 CAL. JUV. JUSTICE COMM'N-PART II, at 78 (draft law, § 730).
283 Cal. Stats. 1963, ch. 1367, § 1, at 2906 (formerly Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns
Code § 730).
284 Cal. Stats. 1965, ch. 1889, § 1, at 4358-59 (formerly Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns
Code § 730).
285 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 730.
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custody of the minors pending hearings. The legislature has recog-
nized this by generally prohibiting their use for post-hearing deten-
tion. The only excuse for the continuance of the exemption is that
rural counties apparently have been unwilling or unable to spend
money to build necessary facilities. The exemption has been perpet-
uated; it should be repealed.
It also should be noted that the language "no county juvenile
home ... within the county" is latently ambiguous. One populous
metropolitan county,28 6 for example, maintains an extensive juvenile
ranch in an adjoining county. Is such a county included in the exemp-
tion? Logically it should not be, and clarification is required.
Coercion Towards Youth Authority Placement
Existing law provides strong financial motivation towards Youth
Authority placement. Such placement costs the county only $25 per
minor per month,28 7 while the subsidy for local facilities is far less
than the cost of erecting28 8 or operating28 9 them. This often results
in a Youth Authority placement where a local placement would be
more in order.290
The Youth Authority already has established a program whereby
counties are offered financial incentives not to commit to the Youth
Authority.291 This program should be expanded to create an operat-
ing subsidy for county facilities, while increasing the rate the county
must pay the state to such an extent as to make Youth Authority
commitments financially unattractive.
Article 11-Modificaions of Juvenile Court Judgments and Orders
Sealing of Records.
A juvenile's record may be sealed 5 years after termination of
the jurisdiction of the court or at age 21, whichever first occurs.
29 2
Sealing is conditioned upon a determination that a minor has not been
convicted of a felony or of any misdemeanor involving moral turpi-
tude, and that rehabilitation has been attained to the satisfaction of
286 City and County of San Francisco.
287 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 912.
288 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 891 provides for state assistance not to
exceed 50% of the project cost, and in no event to exceed $3,000 per bed unit.
289 CAL. WELF. & INsT'NS CODE § 887 provides for the Youth Authority to
reimburse the county in an amount of one-half the cost of maintaining the
child in the facility, but in no event to exceed $95 per month per child.
290 Heman Stark, Director of the Youth Authority, quoted in PRocEmINGs
OF THE 1966 ANNUAL INST. FOR JUV. CT. JUDGES AND REFEREES 21 (1966).
291 CAL. WELF. & IST'NS CODE §§ 1820-27.
292 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODS § 781.
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the court.293 Both the records of the court and of other public agen-
cies are then sealed.
294
The 5-year period is much too long. Take the case of a juvenile
who commits a minor offense at the age of 13 and is placed on proba-
tion. His probation may reasonably be expected to terminate in 2
years at age 15. He then must wait until age 20 for the record to be
sealed. In the meantime all the practical consequences which follow
a juvenile court record will be visited upon him.
The court should be given the power to order the record sealed
at any time following the termination of jurisdiction. Sealing of rec-
ords then could be based on an individual analysis of rehabilitation in
each case. Such legislation was enacted in 1967 and signed by the
Governor, but was "chaptered-out." 29 5 It should be enacted again
in 1968.
Still further protection is needed against ingenious employers and
public agencies,2 96 who circumvent the spirit of the law by asking,
"Has any juvenile court record ever been sealed?" This can be
avoided by specifically authorizing the minor to deny that any record
has been sealed, or by making it unlawful to ask a minor whether ju-
venile court records ever have been sealed.
Ariicle 12-Appeals
Notice of Right to Appeal.
No provision is made for the court to advise the minor of his right
to appeal. The minor and his family often are ignorant of this right,
and have no idea how to proceed to appeal even if they are aware of
that right. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure require the
court to advise the defendant in open court of his right to appeal, and
direct the clerk upon request to prepare and file a notice of appeal..
2 97
A similar provision should be introduced into the juvenile court law.
Review of Dispositions
The President's Commission points out:
While statutes, judges, and commentators still talk the language of
293 Id.
294 Id.
295 A.B. 1162 (providing for immediate sealing) and S.B. 1438 (providing
for sealing after 5 years or at age 21) were both enacted by the legislature
and signed by the Governor. S.B. 1438 was chaptered last in time, and there-
fore supersedes A.B. 1162. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 9605; Opinion of Legislative
Counsel to the Honorable Willie Brown, August 25, 1967, San Francisco,
California.
296 The State Bar of California at one time used such a question in its
application for admission to the Bar. Note, Rights and Rehabilitation in the
Juvenile Courts, 67 CoLum. L. REV. 281, 289 n.46 (1967).
297 FED. R. Cpam. P. 37; STANDARDS 78.
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compassion and treatment, it has become clear that in fact the same
purposes that characterize the use of the criminal law for adult of-
fenders-retribution, condemnation, deterrence, incapacitation-are
involved in the disposition of juvenile offenders too.298
It is therefore appropriate to reconsider the roles that ought to be
played by the appellate court in the juvenile court process.
The President's Commission has suggested that appellate review
of legally imposed sentences should be provided in all criminal
cases. 299 Authority for such review already exists in 12 states and
has been granted by Congress for the military courts.300 The juvenile
court judge is given far greater dispositional power than the criminal
court judge. Virtually no limitations exist on dispositional alterna-
tives, and the jay-walker theoretically may be sent to the Youth
Authority. While such broad power appears desirable, the unusual
scope of discretion makes appellate review of dispositions all the more
appropriate.
Protecting the Identity of Juveniles in Appellate Court Proceedings
Every effort is made to provide anonymity for the juvenile of-
fender at the trial level. The hearings are closed to the public.
301
The public is not allowed access to the court records.
30 2
However, under present practice in California the juvenile totally
sacrifices that anonymity in order to take an appeal. His name is set
forth in the published decision. Disclosure of the minor's name in
the reported opinion is not a difficult problem to solve. It is presently
the practice of some states to report juvenile court opinions as
"Matter of Anonymous" or by using only the minor's first name.
30 3
The author knows of no reason why the California Supreme Court by
rule could not establish similar provisions in California.
VI.
Summary of Recommendations
A balance of power should be restored in the juvenile court com-
plex. The court itself should act as a judicial check on an administra-
tive system. The probation officer should be independent of the juve-
nile court both in appointment and removal, and should be appointed
through a merit system. The juvenile justice commissioner who acts
as the public eye on a court and probation complex that normally act
298 NAT'L CRME CommvI'N REPORT 80.
299 Id. at 140.
800 Id.
801 CAL. WELP. & INsT'xs CODE § 676.
302 CAL. WELF. & INST'NS CODE § 827.
303 See, e.g., the Reports of the State of New York.
in camera, should be appointed by a body outside the juvenile court
complex.
Temporary custody and detention is the weakest area in the
California law at the present time. The probation department should
operate 7 days a week in investigating cases of detained minors, and a
court hearing should be required within 48 hours, non-judicial days
included. Standards for detention should be clarified. Bail should
be available as an ancillary alternative. The probation officer should
advise the parents of the minor that the minor has been detained, and
the minor should be entitled to make the same two telephone calls
permitted to adults. The detention hearing should be a full eviden-
tiary hearing, and the court should be required to make specific find-
ing as to why it has detained the minor.
The jurisdiction of the juvenile court over minors whose parents
cannot provide for them should be transferred to appropriate social
agencies, leaving the juvenile court to deal only with children neg-
lected or abused by their parents. The scope of jurisdiction over acts
now classified as delinquent which do not constitute crimes should be
substantially reduced. Greater use of informal dispositions from pre-
liminary conferences should be encouraged, and these procedures
should be structured towards the end of decreasing the number of
formal adjudications of delinquency.
Jurisdictional and dispositional hearings should be bifurcated,
and should be held on separate days if the minor so requests. Evi-
dence which the court cannot properly consider should never be ad-
mitted at the jurisdictional hearing. The burden of proof at the juris-
dictional hearing should at least be changed from "preponderance of
evidence" to "clear and convincing evidence," and the writer favors
adopting the criminal law standard of "proof beyond a reasonable
doubt" in delinquency cases. The right to trial by jury, hopefully to
be seldom exercised, should be restored. In order to prevent any
possibility of prejudice, the probation officer's report should not be
furnished to the court until after the jurisdictional phase of the hear-
ing is completed.
Attention should be directed to evidentiary standards to be used
on the dispositional hearings, and the minor afforded the opportunity
to cross-examine all persons upon whose statement dispositional rec-
ommendations are made. The dispositional alternatives available to
the court should be expanded in line with the concept that all steps
should be taken to avoid a formal adjudication of delinquency by the
court. The use of the juvenile hall as an illusory treatment resource,
now permitted in counties not having juvenile homes, should be pro-
hibited. Financial considerations which coerce towards Youth Au-
thority placement rather than local placement, should be removed.
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Revisions in the referee system are needed. The minor should
have an absolute right to trial before a judge in the first instance.
Provisions are needed for disqualification of referees, and the use of
probation officers as part-time referees should be prohibited.
Definite standards for transfer of the cases of 16 and 17-year-old
offenders should be established. Revision is required in record seal-
ing provisions to make them effectively fulfill their purpose.
The minor always should be advised of his right to appeal, and
the appellate court should be given specific power to review disposition
in the juvenile court. Finally, the identity of the minor in appellate
proceedings should be protected.
VII.
Conclusion
The Messianic era of the juvenile court has ended. The founders
of the juvenile court system grievously erred in assuming that the
lofty purposes of the juvenile court removed the need for due process
of law. The ability of the juvenile court to effectively rehabilitate
all juveniles was presupposed. We now know that such a belief was
both unjustified and unduly optimistic, and that much of our juvenile
delinquency is basically caused by societal problems with which the
courts alone never can cope.
To recognize the limitations of the juvenile court system does not
mean that the system itself must be abandoned. On the contrary, the
challenge of the juvenile court in coming decades will be to adapt it-
self to its own weaknesses toward the end that maximum use can be
made of its strengths. Since one of the major problems now
faced by the court is the very stigma attached to juvenile court pro-
ceedings, the objectives of the court must focus upon acting as an ef-
fective source of referrals to other agencies unless and until such time
as youth service bureaus are created, and in making maximum use
of informal dispositions and consent decrees to avoid formal adjudica-
tion.
Many cases must and will still come before the court. The great-
est source of rehabilitation the juvenile court itself can offer to the
minor is to provide him with due process of law. The court must con-
vince him that no matter how unfairly he has been treated or thinks
he has been treated in the past by society, that when he finally comes
before the majesty of the law, the first concern will be to scrupulously
safeguard his rights at every stage of the proceedings. The store-
house of the Anglo-American legal system is full of safeguards which
are premised on respect for the individual. The minor who has lost
his own self-respect can begin to reclaim it through the law's respect
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for him. The ultimate end of the juvenile court, both for the minor
and for the protection of society, is rehabilitation. Due process of
law is the first step towards that goal.
